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Introduction

Asia is undoubtedly the world’s most dynamic region in terms of economic growth and is seen as an area to which the global center of gravity is shifting. However, this economically prospering region faces diverse security challenges in an environment of growing uncertainty. The rising influence of China is poised to reshape the region’s balance of power and test the U.S. commitment to its grand strategy of preventing a regional hegemon from gaining military dominance. Geopolitics in Asia is further complicated by the high level of economic interdependence among potential adversaries. Internally, Asian countries are confronted, albeit to varying degrees, with threats to social stability and domestic security that originate in ethnic, religious, ideological and social conflicts. In this brief regional survey, we outline the most salient political, economic, and security characteristics of some of the most important players in Asia. The objective of this survey is to provide a context in which internal security challenges in individual countries can be analyzed and understood.

Table 1: GDP and Per Capita Income in Surveyed Asian Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (USD, trillions)</th>
<th>GDP/capita (USD)</th>
<th>GDP (PPP, trillions)</th>
<th>GDP/capita (PPP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$7.30</td>
<td>$5,422</td>
<td>$11.44</td>
<td>$8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$5.87</td>
<td>$45,939</td>
<td>$4.50</td>
<td>$35,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$1.12</td>
<td>$22,760</td>
<td>$1.57</td>
<td>$32,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$1.68</td>
<td>$1,373</td>
<td>$4.52</td>
<td>$3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$0.35</td>
<td>$5,384</td>
<td>$0.61</td>
<td>$9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$0.85</td>
<td>$3,490</td>
<td>$1.14</td>
<td>$4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$2,210</td>
<td>$0.40</td>
<td>$4,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA World Factbook.
Note: As CIA World Factbook does not list figures for GDP/capita by standard exchange rate, I found the estimated 2011 population by dividing GDP(PPP) by GDP/capita(PPP) and used this number to find a corresponding GDP(USD) for the third column.
Economic Development and Dynamism

The level of economic development in Asia ranges from high-income to middle-income. Of the seven countries surveyed in this report, Japan and Korea are high-income countries with per capita income above $30,000 (PPP). China and Thailand are both high-middle-income countries. Indonesia, the Philippines, and India are low-middle-income countries. Because of their large populations, Asian countries have relatively large economies despite mid-level per capita income. The size of the Chinese economy, roughly $8 trillion measured in exchange rate terms, is the world’s second largest. India’s economy is over $1.6 trillion. The combined economic weight of Asia constitutes a significant portion of the global economy. The nine countries, with a total collective GDP of $17.7 trillion in 2011, here account for nearly 30 percent of the world’s GDP.

Asia’s rising economic heft is driven by the region’s sustained rapid economic growth. In the decade of 2000-2010, every Asian country grew at relatively high rates. The two fastest growing economies were China and India. Indonesia has fully recovered from its economic collapse of 1998 and registered an average GDP growth of 5.2 percent a year. The same was true of South Korea, another country that has made a remarkable recovery from the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis. Even though Japan has stagnated throughout the decade, the new government of Shinzo Abe has launched an ambitious program to revive its economy, with encouraging early results. If anything, Asia’s economic growth is bound to continue, even if we assume a period of slower growth in its major economies (for example, China is likely to record subpar growth due to its macroeconomic imbalances and excess financial leverage). Most countries in the region are expected to maintain high single-digit growth for the foreseeable future. Positive factors contributing to sustained economic growth include a young population (chiefly in India, and Indonesia), urbanization, high savings and investments, regional economic integration, and globalization. Of these factors, the brightest spot is regional economic integration. Asian countries are now each other’s biggest trading partner. Even for countries with delicate geopolitical ties, such as India and China and Japan and China, their bilateral trade has boomed in recent years, with the result that China is today the largest trading partner with both India and Japan.

Table 2: GDP growth 2000-2010 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Finance and Government Solvency

In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the health of Asian countries’ public finance has received renewed scrutiny. By and large, Asian countries have relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio, with the exception of Japan, the most indebted developed economy and Asian country. However, Asian countries cannot afford to be complacent.

China’s real debt-to-GDP ratio is much higher than the official figure of 43.5 percent if off-balance-sheet liabilities such as non-performing loans in the banking system and local government debts are included. The real ratio may approach 80 percent of GDP. India’s debt-to-GDP ratio is low, but its structural budget deficit, at 6.7 percent of GDP, is high. If GDP growth slows, the debt ratio can rise quickly. Malaysia’s structural budget deficit, at 5 percent of GDP, is also unacceptably high. The country at the greatest risk of a sovereign debt crisis is Japan, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 200 percent and a structural budget deficit of nearly 9 percent of GDP. At the moment, most of Japan’s sovereign debt is held by its banks, so foreign investor sentiments do not directly affect the Japanese government’s ability to refinance its debt. But this is clearly an unsustainable fiscal situation.

Public finance and government solvency have direct impact on security in Asian countries. Obviously, availability of abundant fiscal resources is a positive factor in maintaining a modern military and keeping domestic law and order. As this survey shows, countries that have greater fiscal resources have been able to respond more effectively to their security challenges, whether external or domestic.

After the East Asian financial crisis, which began as a currency crisis in Thailand, Asian countries became more prudent in taking on external debt and started building up their foreign exchange reserves. The result is that Asian countries have relatively low amounts of foreign debt and much greater ability to service such debt and withstand current account shocks. Only the Philippines remains vulnerable to runs on its currency because of its relatively small foreign exchange reserves.

Table 3: Government finances (USD, billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$1,646</td>
<td>$1,729</td>
<td>-2.576</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>$697.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$1,971</td>
<td>$2,495</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>208.2</td>
<td>$2,719</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$267.90</td>
<td>$242.00</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<td>$397.30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>$196.40</td>
<td>$308.80</td>
<td>-8.981</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>$267.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$66.21</td>
<td>$70.30</td>
<td>-2.693</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>$115.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$134.20</td>
<td>$144.10</td>
<td>-0.593</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>$158.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$31.40</td>
<td>$35.96</td>
<td>-3.664</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>$62.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA World Factbook

*Data in this column was found on Economywatch.com

Note: For the column ‘Government structural balance,’ I used CIA World Factbook’s figures for budget surplus/deficit. Positive numbers denote a surplus, negatives a deficit.
National and Internal Security in Surveyed Countries

On the regional security front, uncertainty is the dominant theme. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained its robust security presence in Asia, with the overriding objective of preserving a balance of power and deterring aggression. Relatively stable relations between the United States and China have also contributed to stability. But behind Asia’s stability lie de-stabilizing dynamics. The rapid rise of China is changing the regional balance and arousing fears among its neighbors. The changing balance of power is motivating many of China’s neighbors, principally India, Vietnam, and Japan, to increase their defense spending and move closer to the United States. In the meantime, Asia lacks a collective security system, and thus must rely on a U.S.-centric security architecture featuring strong bilateral alliances, powerful forward deployment of American forces, and growing partnerships (chiefly the U.S.-India security relations) to preserve peace.

Asian regional security faces a long list of risks. Territorial disputes among major Asian states (China has land border dispute with India and maritime disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan) can provoke accidental military clashes and prevent these countries from establishing healthier bilateral relations. The South China Sea dispute could lead to naval clashes and drag in the United States. While the prospects of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait have greatly diminished in recent years due to the change of government in Taiwan and warming ties across the strait, a long-term solution remains elusive. Tensions on the Korean peninsula continue to stir worries in the region. Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs pose a serious threat to South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The likelihood of a regime collapse in North Korea cannot be ruled out. Should that happen, East Asia’s security landscape will be fundamentally altered.

The most powerful driver of Asian security in the coming decade will be America’s complex relationship with China. This is a relationship built on a wide range of shared interests but marred by deep strategic distrust. The military modernization program of the Chinese military, with its focus on developing capabilities that will deny American forces unfettered access to the region, has raised alarms in the Pentagon. In the meantime, Washington’s new Asian strategy, dubbed “the pivot,” and its new battle concept, called Air-Sea Battle, are viewed in Beijing as directed against China.

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-2.576</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>33.6</td>
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<td>-9.5</td>
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<td>208.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>2.375</td>
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<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>-8.981</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>-2.693</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-0.593</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>-3.664</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA World Factbook

*Data in this column was found on Economywatch.com
While the United States can count on Japan, Australia, and perhaps South Korea in any future strategic conflict with China, the rest of the region prefers not to take a stand, and does not wish to be forced to do so. Few Asian countries expect to benefit from a fully adversarial relationship between the United States and China because this will destroy the regional stability that is the prerequisite for economic growth.

So for now, Asian regional security continues to evolve amid high uncertainty. The operative word describing each country’s strategy is “hedging” - taking advantage of the present but preparing for the worst.

Table 5: Spending on National and Domestic Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military expenditure (% of gov't expend.)</th>
<th>Military expenditure (% of GDP)</th>
<th>Domestic security spending (% of total defense spending)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>51.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13.67</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>26.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>46.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the United States can count on Japan, Australia, and perhaps South Korea in any future strategic conflict with China, the rest of the region prefers not to take a stand, and does not wish to be forced to do so. Few Asian countries expect to benefit from a fully adversarial relationship between the United States and China because this will destroy the regional stability that is the prerequisite for economic growth.

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“**The most powerful driver of Asian security in the coming decade will be America’s complex relationship with China.**”

**Terrorist Threats**

The level of terrorist threats in Asia is closely correlated with the degree of ethnic, religious diversity and political integration of the countries in the region. Terrorism, defined as the use of violence in pursuit of explicit political objectives, does not exist in Japan and South Korea. In China, terrorism is tied with ethnic conflict and confined to one particular region, Xinjiang. In the Philippines and Thailand, terrorism similarly is a phenomenon restricted to one particular region and one religious group (Muslims). Indonesian terrorist groups are the most active in Southeast Asia and have ties with international terrorist groups. India faces by far the gravest threat from terrorism. In India, terrorist groups come from a variety of backgrounds: politically inspired radicalism (Maoist-Naxalites); ethnic and religious separatism; regional separatism, and foreign-sponsored terrorism. In addition to the danger posed by domestic terrorist groups, state-sponsored terrorism is a serious threat for India (which faces terrorist groups linked with Pakistan’s military intelligence arm) and Korea (which has been a victim of North Korea’s state-sponsored terrorist acts).
In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have made significant progress in containing terrorism. In the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf has been practically destroyed as an organized group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has entered negotiations with the government. Indonesia has similarly weakened Jemaah Islamiya.

China’s anti-terrorism efforts remain controversial because of the issue of human rights violations by the government and the lack of credibility of official reports of terrorist incidents. The rising incidents of ethnic violence and reported attacks in recent years may presage a period of elevated tensions and risks in Xinjiang, an area vital to Chinese national security and energy production.

Overall, except for India (which faces the most serious and comprehensive terrorist threats in the whole of Asia), terrorism is not be problem for a large number of countries and remains a secondary national security issue even in countries with active terrorist groups and threats. It is viewed as a problem under control. The region’s states are robust enough to address terrorist threats. One potential, and perhaps currently neglected, risk is terrorist attacks on the region’s critical infrastructure, such as nuclear facilities, petrochemical plants, gas pipelines, and mass transit systems.

In confronting domestic terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism, surveyed Asian countries adopt very diverse strategies and institutional arrangements. Broadly speaking, Northeast Asian countries surveyed here—China, Japan, and Korea—share similar characteristics. They domestic security system is better funded, more robust, highly centralized and integrated. By comparison, India and Southeast Asian countries have less well-financed domestic security forces; the integration of these forces has not reached as high a level as that in Northeast Asia. Another noteworthy observation from this survey is that countries have different levels of political tolerance of domestic instability and violence. In Northeast Asia, such tolerance is relatively low. Incidents identified as domestic terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism tend to elicit strong and quick response from the government. In Southeast Asia and India, the level of tolerance is much higher. Large numbers of casualties and persistence of domestic terrorist groups often fail to energize the political establishment into decisive action.

Table 6: Key Characteristics of Internal Security Threats in Surveyed Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Regional Political-Radical Left</th>
<th>State-Sponsored-External</th>
<th>Political-Factional</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have made significant progress in containing terrorism. In the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf has been practically destroyed as an organized group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has entered negotiations with the government. Indonesia has similarly weakened Jemaah Islamiya.

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Overall, except for India (which faces the most serious and comprehensive terrorist threats in the whole of Asia), terrorism is not be problem for a large number of countries and remains a secondary national security issue even in countries with active terrorist groups and threats. It is viewed as a problem under control. The region’s states are robust enough to address terrorist threats. One potential, and perhaps currently neglected, risk is terrorist attacks on the region’s critical infrastructure, such as nuclear facilities, petrochemical plants, gas pipelines, and mass transit systems.

In confronting domestic terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism, surveyed Asian countries adopt very diverse strategies and institutional arrangements. Broadly speaking, Northeast Asian countries surveyed here—China, Japan, and Korea—share similar characteristics. They domestic security system is better funded, more robust, highly centralized and integrated. By comparison, India and Southeast Asian countries have less well-financed domestic security forces; the integration of these forces has not reached as high a level as that in Northeast Asia. Another noteworthy observation from this survey is that countries have different levels of political tolerance of domestic instability and violence. In Northeast Asia, such tolerance is relatively low. Incidents identified as domestic terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism tend to elicit strong and quick response from the government. In Southeast Asia and India, the level of tolerance is much higher. Large numbers of casualties and persistence of domestic terrorist groups often fail to energize the political establishment into decisive action.
In defending against domestic terrorist threats, surveyed countries have invested considerable resources in strengthening the security of some of their critical infrastructure, in particular, nuclear facilities. These steps are welcome and encouraging. But overall, terrorist groups’ preferred strategy is to use asymmetrical tactics. Given their small numbers, lack of resources, and political calculations, future terrorist attacks in Asia are most likely to be conducted against soft targets, such as mass transit systems and infrastructure difficult to secure. The horrific terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 is likely to be repeated in other parts of Asia in the future.

The greatest and most difficult challenge facing Asia in combating terrorism in the coming years is to prepare itself against such attacks that require relatively simple logistics and limited financial resources, but can create mass panic and cause devastating damage to public safety and economic activities.

Table 7: Key Characteristics of Internal Security in Surveyed Asian Countries

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
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<tr>
<td>Structure of Internal Security</td>
<td>Vertically Integrated</td>
<td>Vertically Integrated</td>
<td>Vertically Integrated</td>
<td>Lacking Vertical Integration</td>
<td>Lacking Vertical Integration</td>
<td>Lacking Vertical Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision-Making Process</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of Resources</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Tolerance of Terrorist Violence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Hard Targets)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Critical Infrastructure (Soft Targets)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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China
Confronting ethnic conflict, social unrest, and the American “pivot” to Asia
China at a glance

Total GDP (2011 – nominal): $7.318 trillion
Per Capita GDP (2011): $5,445
Population: 1,349,585,838 (2013 estimate)
Urban Population as a percentage of total population: 47%
Major Ethnic Groups: Han (91.5%), Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uigher, Tujia, Yi, Mongol, Tibetan, Buyi, Dong, Yao, other (8.5%)
Median Age of Population: 36.3 years
Number of Police per 100,000: 205
Defense Spending: $119 billion
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 2.0%

China’s National Security Environment

As Asia’s pre-eminent regional power sharing borders with powerful, nuclear-armed neighbors, China is located in a tough geopolitical neighborhood. It has territorial disputes with India, and maritime territorial disputes with Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. The South China Sea disputes have recently escalated. Sino-Japanese relations have also deteriorated. China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan and its declaration of willingness to go to war to prevent the island from seeking de jure independence constitute another source of potential conflict with the United States, which provides a conditional security guarantee to Taiwan. Instability and regime collapse in North Korea may bring China into direct conflict with the United States as well.

In this uncertain strategic environment, China also faces the most challenging task of managing its security relations with the United States, which has an overriding strategic objective of preventing one single power from dominating Asia. Although the United States has no explicit “containment” policy toward China, Washington has taken strategic precautions to hedge against a potentially aggressive and hostile Beijing. It has maintained, even strengthened, its bilateral security alliances with Japan, Korea, and Australia, all of which cast a wary eye on China’s rise. The United States has also reached out to China’s traditional adversaries, such as India and Vietnam. American forward deployment has been strengthened with more lethal advanced weapon systems, such as F-22s and Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines. In the meantime, the United States has maintained its post-1989 arms embargo against China and worked tirelessly to keep China from getting advanced military technologies from the West. The most momentous decision of the Obama administration with respect to China is the announcement of an American “pivot” toward Asia. The basic idea of this redeployment of American military assets is that the United States will keep roughly 60 percent of its naval assets in the Pacific.

To China, these moves seem intended to constrain, if not contain, China’s influence. China’s immediate response to the American “pivot” has been muted. However, over the last two decades, China has been steadily expanding its investment in national security and acquiring capabilities that will increase its power projection. The Chinese armed forces, traditionally a land-based military, are deficient in air and naval power. The realization of this weakness has given Chinese leaders urgency in upgrading the country’s air and naval capabilities. Through a crash import program to purchase weapon
systems from Russia and accelerated indigenous development, China has made significant progress, but the capability gap between China and the United States remains wide.

In the decade ahead, the most dangerous flashpoints for China that may involve the use of force and confrontation with the United States are (in no particular order of probability):

- A naval skirmish with Vietnam in the South China Sea
- A naval skirmish with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea
- Chaos resulting from regime collapse in North Korea
- Renewed tensions with Taiwan should the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party return to power
- Piracy, terrorism, or maritime accidents that result in the blocking of the Malacca Strait shipping lanes
- Maritime accidents involving Chinese, American, or Japanese naval vessels
- Border skirmishes with India in disputed areas

Domestic Security and Terrorist Threats

If China’s external security challenges are daunting, its domestic security situation is no less challenging. The ruling Communist Party faces mounting social unrest, opposition from social activists and political dissidents, ethnic separatism and related terrorist threats, and growing need to protect its critical infrastructure. The costs of maintaining social stability are rising rapidly. Official reports disclose that domestic security spending reached $111.4 billion in 2012. The bulk of such spending goes toward the maintenance of the police, state security, armed militia, courts and jails that constitute the domestic security apparatus. One Chinese magazine, Caijing, reported that roughly 17 percent of the domestic security budget goes to the People’s Armed Police, China’s anti-riot force.
Social Instability

As a rapidly changing society, China is experiencing growing social dislocation and stress. Part of this process is integral to the modernization process. But government policies also contribute to rising social unrest. Unprecedented income inequality, caused by a combination of factors, has not been addressed adequately by the government. Corruption is pervasive. Property rights remain insecure, resulting in daily clashes between peasants, urban residents and government officials who try to seize their land and houses. Poor environmental protection has also become a cause of social protest. Riots and mass protests have grown exponentially over the last decade. There were reportedly 180,000 such incidents in China in 2011.8

Political Opposition to One-party Rule

The Chinese Communist Party has successfully resisted the global trend of democratization since the Tiananmen crisis of 1989. However, its hold on power is beginning to encounter growing opposition from social activists and pro-democracy elements in Chinese society. The explosive growth of the Internet in China has further reduced the party’s capacity to control the flow of information, and has now allowed Chinese society to have a powerful collective voice in holding the government accountable. Many government policies, such as family-planning, environmental stewardship, healthcare, and education, now face unprecedented public scrutiny and criticisms.

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in profile

Area: 1,660,000 sq. km
Ethnic makeup: Uighur 46%, Han 39%, Kazak 7%, Other 8%
GDP per capita: 29,310 yuan ≈ $4,650
Main industries: oil and petrochemicals; textiles; agribusiness

Industry, wealth, and political power are all centered in the north, particularly the capital city Urumqi as well as Karamay and Shihezi; northern Xinjiang is where most oil is produced and refined, and has a large Han population, as well as much higher GDP per capita. Southern Xinjiang is much less developed, heavily agricultural, and poorer, as well as mostly Uighur

Xinjiang is the homeland of the Uighurs, a Muslim, Turkic minority
Terrorism and Ethnic Conflict

Terrorism and ethnic conflict are closely connected in China. Although occasionally disgruntled Chinese citizens would use explosives to blow up government buildings, the motivations for such acts are personal frustrations and vengeance. By comparison, reported terrorist acts (bus bombings and attacks on government buildings and officials) occur in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities that aspire to more autonomy, if not independence.

China has a large number of ethnic minority groups. Although they account for 8-9 percent of the Chinese population, these groups inhabit more than half of China’s land mass and concentrate in the two most strategic regions – Tibet and Xinjiang, both of which were incorporated into China relatively recently (Tibet in 1950 and Xinjiang in the Qing Dynasty). Conditions in both Tibet and Xinjiang have grown unstable since 2008. Large-scale riots in the provincial capitals of both areas in March 2008 and July 2010, respectively, resulted in large numbers of deaths. More than 100 nuns and monks in and around Tibet have committed self-immolation in the past three years.

Because of the Dalai Lama’s moral authority and call for non-violent resistance, the conflict between Han Chinese and Tibetans has remained largely non-violent, despite the rare clash that erupted in Tibet in March 2008. However, the situation in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (see Box) is different. The conflict there is marred by violence. To be sure, there are disputes regarding the nature of the violence. The Chinese government has labeled such violence as terrorism and those engaged in such violence as terrorists. Four Uighur organizations – ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement), ETLO (East Turkestan Liberation Organization), WUC (World Uighur Congress), and ETIC (East Turkestan Information Centre)
Box 1: Reported Major Terrorist Incidents and Ethnic Riots in China in Recent Years

- Bus bombings have been the most prevalent form of terrorist attack in China since the early 1990s, with four attacks occurring in Xinjiang capital city Urumqi in 1992, three also in Urumqi and one in Beijing in 1997, and two in Kunming and one in Shanghai in 2008.

- Chinese officials claimed to have foiled a number of terrorist plots leading up to the Olympic Games in 2008, including an attempted hijacking and planned suicide bombings; these claims met with skepticism from outside observers.

- Videotaped threats purporting to be from ETIM took responsibility for a number of bombings in several cities across China shortly before the Beijing Olympics.

- Sporadic episodes of violence and anti-government protest in Xinjiang are frequently blamed on allegedly terrorist Uighur organizations; furthermore, in 2012 the Chinese government added six Uighur men to its terror list.

- The Turkistan Islamist Party, another name which ETIM is known by, released a video in September 2011 taking responsibility for two attacks that July in Hotan and Kashgar of Xinjiang Province that left 33 dead.

Whatever the characterization of the nature of the conflict in Xinjiang, the fact that the region has experienced in recent years rising violence remains hardly disputed (See Box I). The Chinese government claims that 162 people died because of the violence perpetrated by Uighur groups between 1990 and 2001 alone. Many causes contribute to the rising violence in Xinjiang. Aside from a heightened ethnic identity among the Uighurs, in-migration of Han Chinese as private entrepreneurs and Xinjiang’s growing role as the main producer of energy for China are commonly believed to have contributed to ethnic grievances felt by the Uighurs.
Organization of Internal Security

The ruling Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) top priority is its continuation in power. Thus, China has an extensive, highly sophisticated and effective domestic security apparatus. At the top of this apparatus is the Politics and Law Committee of the CCP. The committee today is headed by Mr. Meng Jianzhu, a member of the party’s Politburo and also a former Minister of Public Security. The Central Military Affairs Commission, which commands China’s People’s Liberation Army, shares operational authority with the State Council, the country’s cabinet, over the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the country’s paramilitary force that is responsible for internal security. In practice, this means that a military officer with the General rank is the commander of the PAP (he is appointed by the Central Military Affairs Commission) while the Minister of Public Security, a member of the cabinet, serves as the first commissar of the PAP. The deployment of PAP units, based on this chain of command, requires dual consent — civilian authorization by the Ministry of Public Security (and local police chiefs or heads of chairmen of local party organization’s law and politics committees) and superior PAP commanding officers.

The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for routine law enforcement activities. The CCP’s Politics and Law Committee maintains control and oversight over this ministry.

In response to terrorist threats, the Chinese government quickly set up an internal coordinating mechanism after 9/11. At the central level, the government formed “National counter-terrorism coordination group.” The leading group is headed by the Minister of Public Security and supported by the National Counter-Terrorism Office. At the end of 2001, the Ministry of Public Security established a new “Counter-Terrorism” Bureau (officially called Bureau 27) as well. A vice-minister of public security is now in charge of counter-

- Occasional bombings occurred in Tibet throughout the 1990s, and in 2002 a bombing in Chengdu, Sichuan Province was blamed on Tibetan separatists.
- In March 2008 riots erupted in Lhasa, Tibet as a commemoration of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising turned violent; Han and Hui-Muslim Chinese were killed by rioters and Chinese-owned shops were burned as Tibetans protested. The Chinese government reported 18 civilians and 1 policeman died.
- In July 2009, the worst riot in Xinjiang occurred in Urumqi, the provincial capital. The government reported 197 people died (most of knife wounds) and more than 1,700 were injured. Most of the victims were Han.
- In June 2012, the Chinese authorities claimed that six Uighurs attempted to hijack an airliner departing the city of Hotan, but they were subdued by crew and passengers.
- In April 2013, China reported that 21 people, including six alleged terrorists, were killed in an attack on police and neighborhood watchers.
- In June 2013, at least 27 people died in an attack on a police station and government offices in Turpan Prefecture in Xinjiang. Attackers used knifes and set police cars on fire. Among the dead were 10 police officers and security guards.
terrorism and heads the National Counter-Terrorism Center. In subsequent years, each province set up similar “counter-terrorism coordination leading groups.” Based on public information, such groups are operated out of the “counter-terrorism” division of the police department of each province and typically chaired by the local police chiefs. Members of the leading group include heads of all departments (such as finance, civil affairs, and housing), chief executives of utilities and telecom companies, and heads of emergency response departments. Such “counter-terrorism coordination leading groups” have been established in prefecture-level jurisdictions (around 300) and major state bureaucracies (such as the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission). The purpose of forming such groups is to raise the level of effectiveness and coordination among various government agencies in preventing terrorist attacks and responding to such attacks should they occur.

In terms of organizational response to terrorism, the Chinese state seems to have acted promptly. In less than a decade, there is a special joint anti-terrorism office (counter-terrorism coordination group) at the provincial level of the government (including the paramilitary Production and Construction Corp. in Xinjiang) and in 14 major coastal cities.

People’s Armed Police (PAP)

The People’s Armed Police is largely responsible for internal security in the PRC. It is China’s principal anti-terrorism force. A 2009 law defines its duties to include the management of rebellion, rioting, large-scale violence, terrorist attack, and any other manner of social instability. On a more regular basis, it is also responsible for the protection of key government buildings, industrial facilities, airports, prisons, and other targets. The list below summarizes its five responsibilities:

- Protection of critical infrastructure, enterprises, warehouses, water sources, irrigation projects, electric grids and generating plants, communication nodes and centers.
- Protection of critical bridges and tunnels on key transportation routes.
- Armed patrol in provincial capitals or other important cities during critical periods.
- Participation in the handling of riots, uprisings, serious violent crimes, terrorist attacks and other social stability incidents.

The PAP originally was part of the Ministry of Public Security and assigned responsibilities such as border security. During the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong ordered the PAP disbanded and its units absorbed by local military garrisons commanded by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese government restored the PAP in its current organizational form in 1983 when it took units responsible for internal security from the PLA and put them in an independent organization, the PAP. In 1996, the Chinese government significantly expanded the size of the PAP by giving it 14 light infantry divisions of the PLA as a result of downsizing the PLA’s land forces.
On paper, the PAP is 660,000 strong (however, the real size of the PAP, the PAP may be much larger) is a branch of the Chinese military and is under the dual management of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC). The State Council is responsible for the Force’s organization, size, command, routine operation, and material provision — the PAP budget is an independent segment of state expenditures. The CMC is responsible for structure, officer training, and political work, and supervises headquarters.

Concerning response to internal security challenges, the Ministry of Public Security directs the People’s Armed Police. For coordination purposes, the Minister of Public Security simultaneously holds the post of First Political Commissar of the PAP; similarly, heads of public security at lower administrative levels serve as commissars of the corresponding PAP division. Public security agencies at all levels may mobilize the forces under their jurisdiction to respond to crises.

The People’s Armed Police consists of a main body of Internal Troops and four non-combat corps — the Forestry, Gold Mining, Transportation, and Hydropower Troops — whose primary tasks are economic in nature. The Internal Troops are composed of mobile divisions, provincial general corps, and special police units. Mobile divisions, available for deployment anywhere in China, are based out of PAP headquarters in Beijing and are not controlled by the Ministry of Public Security. Provincial general corps exist in every province and equivalent administrative division (of which there are 33), including municipalities and autonomous regions. Each general corps contains at least one mobile unit for responding to crises. At the
succeeding administrative stratum, every prefecture and prefecture-level city (there are 333) has a PAP detachment (equal to a regiment in strength); even further down, there is a PAP group battalion or company at every county-level division (2,862). Lastly, there are special police units (SPUs) at both the national level, under headquarters in Beijing, and at local levels. These units are specialized and highly-trained in crisis response capabilities including explosives disposal, hostage rescue, riot control, anti-hijacking, and counter-terrorism.

The PAP has two special units with the unusually explicit designation of “counter-terrorist detachment.” One is the “Xinjiang Uyghir Autonomous Region Public Security Department Special Anti-Terrorist Intelligence and Investigation Unit.” (It has another bland official designation: Division No. 16 of the Xinjiang Uyghir Autonomous Region Public Security Department). The other is the “Tibetan Autonomous Region Public Security Department Special Anti-Terrorist Intelligence and Investigation Unit.” Each unit is designated as a “sub-divisional unit,” which implies its importance and possibly independent status. Even though nominally these two units are under the administrative umbrella of the regional public security bureaucracy, they are part of the PAP. What is worth noting that no other PAP regional command has specially designated anti-terrorist units. The Chinese government has singled out Xinjiang and Tibet because it fears that ethno-nationalism in these two regions are the political driving force behind terrorism.

In addition to its main mission of law and order, the Chinese police is also responsible for suppressing domestic political dissent (it has a large domestic security division), fighting narcotic and human trafficking and organized crime. Combating terrorism, however, is not its assigned mission.

The Ministry of State Security (MSS)

The Ministry of State Security, China’s equivalent of the Soviet KGB and the American CIA, is primarily responsible for external intelligence gathering and analysis. It was formed before the Communist Party came to power in 1949 to collect intelligence in areas under the control of the Nationalist government. In 1955, it was renamed and reorganized as the Central Investigation Department (CID) of the Chinese Communist Party. In 1983, a major government restructuring led to the merger of the CID and the counter-intelligence units of the Ministry of Public Security, with the combined organization named the Ministry of State Security. This ministry reports to the Politics and Law Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and is headed by a senior party official with the rank of the Central Committee member.

The number of employees of the Ministry is classified. Although the principal missions of the Ministry are usually overseas, its personnel, mainly employed in activities directed against political dissent, terrorists threats and foreign visitors, also operate inside China.
Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Protecting critical infrastructure, including airports, nuclear power plants, oil and gas pipelines, power grids, large petrochemical plants, and large hydroelectric dams, presents another challenge to the Chinese government. Many of these facilities are located in and near population centers. Accidents and terrorist attacks could cause catastrophic consequences.

Airport Security

China’s civil aviation industry has undergone an unprecedented expansion in the last three decades. Today there are 182 commercial airports in China. About 50 of them are for dual military-civilian use. The three largest civilian airports in China are the Beijing Capital International Airport, Guangzhou Baiyun, and Shanghai Pudong. Beijing Capital happens to be the second largest airport worldwide, with 81,929,359 passengers accommodated in 2012. In the same year, 48,548,430 passengers passed through Guangzhou Baiyun and 44,880,164 were served at Shanghai Pudong. China’s air passenger traffic also totaled 318.99 million in 2012, a 9.2% increase from the prior year.

The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) supervises China’s civil aviation industry, including airport and flight security. Within the CAAC are seven regional administrations broken into 26 Safety Supervision Offices, each of which is responsible for the regulation and safety supervision of airlines and airports in its area. An air police force established by the CAAC’s Public Security Bureau in 2002 protects flights. People’s Armed Police units guard the country’s major airports.
Nuclear Security

China’s National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) is in charge of evaluating nuclear facilities’ safety, security, and design, producing physical security guidelines, issuing licenses, enforcing international nuclear safety agreements, and testing imported nuclear safety equipment. The NNSA is part of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, and is chaired by a Vice Minister. It works closely with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and reports to the State Council, but is perceived to be influenced by the CAEA, the main government body charged with developing the country’s civilian nuclear program.

The China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) formulates nuclear policy, guidelines, and regulations, heads indigenous nuclear research, and develops the nuclear workforce. The CAEA is also responsible for planning new capacity and

“China has the most ambitious plans to expand its nuclear power industry because of its huge demand for electricity and because of its need to reduce pollution and CO2 emissions”
conducting feasibility studies for proposed plants. In 2010, the CAEA began working with the United States Departments of Energy and Defense to establish a Center of Excellence in Beijing, which is expected to open in 2012. The Center will enable information and methods sharing between the US, China, and other Asian countries, and provide facility and materials protection and management training to Chinese nuclear personnel.

Licenses for the possession of nuclear materials are issued by the Office of Nuclear Materials Control, which is under the CAEA but reports to the NNSA. The State Council Research Office (SCRO) acts as an advisory bureau to China’s State Council and investigates the country’s nuclear program and regulation measures from time to time. In 2011 SCRO suggested that the nuclear energy industry’s growth rate was outflanking the evolution of a safety culture and also noted the country’s low regulators-to-reactors ratio.

The physical security of nuclear power plants in China is jointly provided for by the plants themselves and the government. The companies which build and operate China’s nuclear facilities are all state-owned enterprises under SASAC (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission), the largest by far being the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). CNNC is the main builder, holder, and operator of nuclear power plants in China, and has stakes in all currently operating plants. Every plant has its own professional security force charged with the protection of nuclear
materials. Access to nuclear materials is limited to as few staff as possible and plants maintain strict control over the entry and exit of vehicles, individuals, and packages. Facility design takes advantage of ‘defense in depth’ and plants are arranged into vital, protected, control, and non-detection areas demarcated by concentric perimeters and systems of access control. Detection relies on video frequency surveillance, microwave detectors, Doppler infrared detectors, and tensile detection systems. Major facilities are also guarded by government security forces, presumably People’s Armed Police units. All plants undergo safety reviews at least once a year.

At the moment, China’s nuclear power plants have a gross capacity of 12,563 MW. China has the most ambitious plans to expand its nuclear power industry because of its huge demand for electricity and because of its need to reduce pollution and CO2 emissions caused by coal-fired power plants, which make up the majority of China’s power generation capacity. China currently has 14 operating nuclear reactors at five different locations as well as 26 under construction. China’s nuclear power plants are all located along the coast, with two near Shenzhen (across Hong Kong), one in Zhejiang province south of Shanghai, one in northern Jiangsu, and one in Beijing. Furthermore, all reactors under construction are also along the coast, at eight new sites: Guangxi, Hainan, Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, and Liaoning. France has supplied most of the equipment and technology for China’s nuclear power plants. Westinghouse, now part of Toshiba, is another supplier of reactor technology.

In the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan, China temporarily put on hold plans to approve additional nuclear power plants. But it has restarted the approval process and the expansion plan is on course. Among many challenges facing China in ensuring the safety of its nuclear power plants, physical protection, training of staff, and strict enforcement of safety rules top the list. In addition, the management system overseeing China’s nuclear industry may need to be streamlined to ensure authority and accountability.

**Energy Industry Infrastructure**

China is one of the world’s largest producers of energy. Its vast energy infrastructure is also vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attacks. (See Appendix II) In particular, some of China’s large oil and gas pipelines originate and traverse unstable regions in Xinjiang. Among the high-value pipelines are:

1. **Major gas pipelines operated by China National Gas and Petroleum Corp. (CNPC)**

   - Sebei-Xining-Lanzhou Gas Pipeline: distributes natural gas through Qinghai and Gansu (931 km)
   - Shaan-Jing Pipeline: transports natural gas from Jingbian, Shaanxi province to Beijing (1,105 km); Second Shaan-Jing Pipeline (935 km); Ji-Ning Branch: links Second Shaan-Jing Pipeline at Anping to West-East Gas Pipeline in Qingshan (1,242 km)
   - West-East Gas Pipeline: carries natural gas from Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin through Gansu, southern Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia, linking up with the Shaan-Jing Pipeline before turning southeastward through Shaanxi, Henan, Anhui, and finally Jiangsu province to bring natural gas to Shanghai and other cities in the Yangtze River Delta region.
   - Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline: transports natural gas to Khorgos, Xinjiang from Turkmenistan, passing through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (1,794 km in length; outside China)
   - Second West-East Gas Pipeline: The trunk line connects the Central Asia-China Pipeline at Khorgos to Guangzhou, southern China by way of Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia (where it branches to hook up with Shaan-Jing), southeastward through Shaanxi, Henan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, and then south into Guangdong.
   - Zhongxian-Wuhan Gas Pipeline: disperses natural gas from Chongqing, Sichuan through Hubei and Hunan provinces and connects to the West-East Pipeline in Wuhan (1,375 km)
2. Major gas pipelines operated by China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec)

- Sichuan-Shanghai Gas Pipeline: carries natural gas from Puguang gas field, Sichuan eastward to Shanghai (2,246 km)
- Yulin-Jinan Gas Pipeline and Shandong Provincial Pipeline Network: brings natural gas from Yulin, Shaanxi, to Jinan, Shandong, and disperses it throughout Shandong province as well as Henan (2,287 km)

3. Major Oil Pipelines operated by CNPC

- China-Russia Oil Pipeline: brings oil to Daqing, Heilongjiang province, from Siberia (1,030 km)
- Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline: brings oil from Kazakhstan into China through border town Alashankou (962 km), eventually to large refinery at Dushanzi, Xinjiang province (246 km)
- Western Crude Oil Pipeline: Shanshan, Xinjiang to Lanzhou, Gansu (1,562 km)
- Daqing-Fushun Crude Pipeline: Daqing, Heilongjiang to Fushun, Liaoning (664 km)
- Tieling-Dalian Crude Pipeline: Liaoning, through Fushun (460 km)
- Tieling-Qinhuangdao Crude Pipeline: Tieling, Liaoning to Qinhuangdao, Hebei (454 km)

4. Sinopec Oil Pipelines

- The Sinopec Pipeline Transport and Storage Company owns and operates 6,132.24 km total oil pipelines; according to Sinopec’s website, PSTC moves crude oil from Shengli (in northern Shandong), Zhongyuan (in Henan/ Shandong), Henan (southwest Henan), and Jianghan (in eastern Hubei) oil fields to its refineries along the coast

5. CNPC Products Pipelines

- Western Products Pipeline: Urumqi Petrochemical Company, Xinjiang to Lanzhou, Gansu (1,858 km)
- Lanzhou-Chongqing-Chengdu Products Pipeline: Lanzhou Petrochemical Company, Gansu to Chongqing (1,250 km)
- Dagang-Zaozhuang Products Pipeline: Dagang Petrochemical Company, Tianjin to Zaozhuang, Shandong (654 km)

Mass Transit Systems

China’s most frequently used subways are located in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. The Beijing Subway has a current route length of 456 km and 10 million daily passengers. By 2015, the Beijing Subway is anticipated to have 19 lines totaling 561 km.12

Expanding by approximately 30km on an annual basis, the Shanghai Metro currently has 430 km across nine lines, which carry 7 million passengers daily.13 In total, the Guangzhou Metro’s routes are 236 km long and anticipated to surpass 500 km by 2016.14 In 2010, the Guangzhou Metro transported over 3.8 million passengers on a daily basis.15

Securing China’s fast-growing subway systems against potential terrorist attacks remains a tough challenge. Around the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Chinese authorities began to install X-ray screening equipment in subway stations in Beijing. In 2010, because of the Shanghai Expo, the municipal government in Shanghai also installed X-ray screening equipment in subway stations. However, it is unclear how well-trained the staff is and how strict the screening process is.
Summary

Like its northeast Asian neighbors, China boasts a centralized and powerful security apparatus that is well-funded and equipped. The Chinese government has responded quickly to the organizational challenges posed by terrorism since 9/11. However, the dominant challenges to its internal security remain little changed. Politically, the one-party state is confronting calls for greater political openness and accountability. In terms of internal security, the greatest risks originate in China’s ethnic conflict, concentrated in Xinjian and Tibet. At the moment, the Chinese security forces are able to contain the unrest (which has been growing in recent years), but securing China’s soft targets against future attacks will remain a politically necessary, technically complex and financially costly challenge.
Endnotes

1  http://data.worldbank.org/country/china
5  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
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8  WSJ, 26 September 2011.
9  http://world.time.com/2012/11/02/china-airport-boom-will-there-be-a-bust/
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India at a glance

Total GDP (2011- nominal): $1.873 trillion
Per Capital GDP (2011): $1,509
Population: 1,220,800,359 (2013 estimate)
Urban Population as a percentage of total population: 30%
Major Ethnic Groups: Indo-Aryan (72%), Dravidian (25%)
Median Age of Population: 26.7 years
Number of Police per 100,000: 124
Defense Spending: $37.7 billion
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 2.5%

Introduction

India is a country rife with conflict. A fragmented nation, India hosts a multiplicity of linguistic, caste, regional, and tribal identities. It is no secret that identity politics is the most salient type of politics in India.

Given its vast array of internal differences, India’s internal security threat is accordingly severe, violent, and diverse. In 2011, the United States’ National Counterterrorism Center reported that India had the 4th highest number of terrorist attacks in the world and the 5th highest number of attack-related deaths.

Causes of Conflict

While India’s enormous regional, religious, and cultural diversity has certainly played a role, there are many other factors contributing to the high level of violence within the country.

The hostility between India and Pakistan is a key reason. In 1947, hundreds of thousands were killed in the partition of India and creation of Pakistan, and the two countries have endured tense and tenuous relations since. In the history of their conflict, Pakistan has often used asymmetrical means, such as terrorist attacks, to balance India’s superior conventional capabilities. Today, multiple anti-Indian terrorist groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Muhammad, and the Harakut ul-Mujahadeen, have sanctuary inside Pakistan and are apparently supported by Pakistan’s military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. In September 2012, the cyber division of Pakistan’s ISI was assigned the task of training insurgent groups in the use of cyber technology.

The territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is clearly a major cause of terrorism and ethnic conflict. In the wake of the partition between India and Pakistan, states retained the right to choose between the countries. Jammu and Kashmir’s Hindu ruler chose to join the nascent India, despite the states’ predominantly Muslim populations, setting the stage for decades of future conflict. In 2010, police and protestors clashed violently in Indian-administered Kashmir, a rapid flashpoint in a conflict that has already claimed the lives of 70,000 civilians. Tensions in the disputed region remain high and incidents of violence are frequent.

“India’s internal security threat is accordingly severe, violent, and diverse.”
The Radical political movement, the Maoist Naxalites, has grown into a potent insurgency active in central and eastern India, an area now known as the “Red Corridor.”11 Spearheaded by the leftist Communist Party of India, the Maoist insurgency is armed by the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army, a force that is estimated to have roughly 7,000 cadres and 5,500 firearms, including AK rifles, light machine guns, self-loading rifles, carbines, grenades, and landmine technology.12 The extreme left still holds a persuasive argument for poor Indians in the Red Corridor, especially to India’s 70 million tribal forest-dwellers who lack access to basic healthcare and government services.13 Finally, as a country dominated by a Hindi religious majority but inhabited by more than 100 million Muslims, India has been periodically rocked by communal violence and riots between these two groups.

Approach to Battling Terrorism

India’s approach to fighting terrorism at home is still a work-in-progress. With each iteration, anti-terrorism legislation has improved in effectiveness and legality. In the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, the government has begun significant defense reforms in an effort to produce integrated, joint responses to internal insecurity at the state and federal level between military, police, paramilitary and intelligence agencies. The success of these reforms is debatable, however, and challenges include political conflict at the national level between parties and tensions between the federal government and states.

The country has a history of passing unpopular anti-terrorism legislations. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) was enacted in 1985. It was India’s first effort to define and counter terrorism. For the eleven years of its existence, TADA was subject to international and domestic criticism. It allowed indiscriminate use of preventative detention on citizens, and later investigation revealed that political opponents, religious minorities, lower caste

Major anti-Indian Terrorist Groups

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): The Army of the Righteous was formed in 1990 in Afghanistan, and it is headed by its founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. LeT has been outlawed in India, designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States, banned in Britain, and proscribed by the United Nations. In 2002, General Pervez Musharraf banned the organization during his leadership of Pakistan. LeT has similar beliefs as Osama bin-Laden and seeks to restore Islamic rule in India and unify all Muslim nations. It is headquartered in Muridke, Pakistan and is funded, armed, and trained by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), with training camps throughout the nation. LeT primarily operates in Jammu and Kashmir, but it has also attacked numerous other parts of India. The organization has built a strong terror network with other Islamist organizations within India and has support bases across the country. The LeT is known for launching attacks on security forces and civilians and was responsible for the attack on Mumbai in 2008.
groups, and petty criminals were all specifically targeted. In a direct contravention of due process, the Act also considered statements made in police custody as truthful and valid confessions, enabling the police to use extortion and torture to extract confessions from citizens in their custody. To the relief of citizens and human rights organizations, TADA was not renewed in 1995.

In March 2002, India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). This was in the wake of the United States’ September 11th attacks, escalating conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, an allegedly Pakistan-sponsored suicide attack on the Parliament in New Delhi, and deadly rioting between Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat in response to the deaths of 59 Hindu pilgrims in a train fire. POTA granted the government sweeping authority to investigate those suspected of terrorism or harboring terrorists, cut-off terrorist financing, and ban extremist organizations. Under POTA’s provisions, the government allowed for the criminalization of certain activities and for the use of regulated surveillance and gathering of evidence against terror suspects.

Moreover, under POTA the government had the power to label certain parties as terrorist groups. Those who associated with or supported such groups could be prosecuted and detained for up to 180 days without official charges. Law enforcement agencies were allowed to withhold the identities of witnesses and, like in TADA, treat confessions made to the police as admissions of guilt.

These cases would subsequently be seen by special courts, which would transfer them to regular courts if appropriate. POTA 2002 also provided for due process related to confessions and outlined the appeal process; however, in practice due process was often ignored.

During the law’s tenure, the reigning Vajpayee administration used POTA to ban 32 organizations, which was considered a success. Yet, like its predecessor TADA, POTA was frequently abused as well. State officials would use POTA to arrest their

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM): the Army of Muhammad is a relatively new terrorist outfit, formed in Karachi, Pakistan, in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, former general-secretary of Harakut-ul-Mujahadeen (see below). Jaish-e-Muhammad has been outlawed in India and designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States. The organization primarily operates in Jammu and Kashmir and it seeks to “liberate Kashmir,” using violence in order to prompt the withdrawal of Indian security forces. Like LeT, Jaish-e-Muhammad is funded by Pakistan’s ISI. The organization is known for its suicide attacks. In these attacks, operatives storm a high security target (such as bases, camps, or convoys) and fortify their position, killing as many security personnel as possible before they are killed in action. Jaish-e-Muhammad is responsible for the attack on India’s Parliament in New Delhi.
opponents, minorities were targeted for indefinite detention, and those detained were subject to long incarcerations. Given India’s clogged judicial system, those incarcerated had little access to due process and were considered guilty-until-proven-innocent. As happened with TADA, by accepting confessions made to police officers as legal, POTA inadvertently promoted the use of enhanced interrogation and torture on citizens. For these reasons, POTA was quite unpopular with human rights organizations. It was repealed in September 2004 by India’s newly elected United Progressive Alliance.

Today, the cornerstone of the government’s security policy today is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Ordinance. Passed in the wake of POTA’s repeal, this legislation requires that arrested citizens be produced to courts within 24 hours. Suspects also have the right to apply for bail. Confessions made to police officers are considered inadmissible in court, and POTA’s special courts have been abolished in favor of the common legal system. The Ordinance has also been referred to as the “Patriot Act” of India because allows for unlimited tapping of communications. Any information intercepted without permission is considered permissible in court. As a result, although the Ordinance has improved upon POTA and TADA in regards to human rights, it also provides less protection of privacy than its predecessors.

Supporting the Ordinance is the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, which allows military personnel to escalate use of deadly force rapidly by granting them legal immunity for their actions. This has been accused of reinforcing the military’s tendency to rely on violent suppression rather than negotiation.

In Jammu and Kashmir, the government has pursued a tough counterinsurgency strategy that includes controlling terrorist infiltration, eliminating terrorist operatives, and winning local civilian support.

Indian Mujahideen (IM): The Indian Mujahideen appeared on India’s radar in 2008 and seems to have been operational since 2007. Indian intelligence sources claim that the organization could be working on ISI orders. The Indian Mujahideen advocates extremist Islam, with the intent of uniting all Muslim nations. Its largest subgroup is codenamed Call of Islam, with roughly 60,000 members, all who are at least 35 years old and on the surface appear to be law-abiding citizens. Next in the hierarchy are the 6,000 Ikhwan (brothers) who wait to be activated, otherwise pursuing “normal” lives. Below them are Ansars, or helpers, who plan attacks, purchase the necessary materials, and plant bombs. Second-to-last in the hierarchy is a group codenamed the White Falcon, which is tasked with enlisting and indoctrinating children between 5-10 years of age. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood operates on the lowest tier with the goal of generating funding for the Indian Mujahideen. This organization is known for serially bombing three areas of Mumbai in 2011.
In its quest to win and maintain “hearts and minds,” the Ministry of Defense allocates a part of its own budget towards village-based education, women’s empowerment, health care, community development, and infrastructure improvement projects. These are carried out by Op Sadhbhavana, the Indian Army’s military-civic action group. Through additional funding, the government has strengthened security forces in the troubled region.

In the Northeast (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh), the government has been conducting negotiations with militant groups to reduce violent incidents, while continuing to take action against those who do not comply. Border security is being increased through increased surveillance and improvements to existing infrastructure, such as fencing, roads, and lighting. Through the Police Modernisation Scheme, local police and intelligence agencies are receiving additional funding. Security forces are being deployed to assist in operations, while the state authorities are given assistance in raising personnel.

To deal with the Naxalite (Maoist) threat, the government carries out security operations as well as public outreach. Specific units, such as the Central Paramilitary Forces and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action, are being assigned to combat terrorist threats. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency schools are being set up, and training is being provided to the police. The command structure in West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa has been restructured; 12,000 special police officers have been deployed by the national government to states harboring Naxalite activity. Jharkhand has recently indicated that it intends to transfer responsibility from the central paramilitary forces to the Jharkand Armed Police, a state force.16
State police forces are also receiving additional infrastructure and funding through the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces and Security Related Expenditure Scheme. Provisions for accommodating Naxalite voluntary surrender and assistance (financial compensation) for victims of Naxalite violence are also in place.

**Major Government Agencies and Forces Responsible for Internal Security**

India’s Ministry of Home Affairs is in charge of specific departments and agencies, including national police, paramilitary, and domestic intelligence.

The various departments that make up the Ministry of Home Affairs include the Department of Internal Security, Department of States, Department of Jammu & Kashmir, and Department of Border Management. The Department of Internal Security deals with the law enforcement and justice system. The Department of States is responsible for state relations and the Freedom Fighters’ Pension (A compensation plan for former political prisoners and activists predating Indian independence). The Department of Jammu and Kashmir Affairs handles constitutional issues within the state. The Department of Border Management oversees both land and coastal borders. The federal agencies under the command of the Ministry of Home Affairs are the Intelligence Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, Indian Police Service, and National Investigation Agency.

**Lashkar-E-Omar (LeO):** Reportedly founded in January 2002, The Army of Omar is a loose conglomerate of cadres of several Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Qari Abdul Hai is rumored to be the head of the conglomerate, and most of the organization’s key members are veterans of the jihad in Afghanistan that took place in the 1980s. The organization has suicide units, some of which are rumored to target foreign nationals. LeO is closely linked to the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

**Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen (HM):** The Party of Freedom Fighters was founded in 1989 in Kashmir Valley, led by Master Ahsan Dar. The organization has a reputation for regularly perpetrating violence across India, and it has recruits drawn from domestic and foreign sources. In the wake of the deaths of several of the organization’s leaders, the HM has undergone severe internal disorganization and strife. The group is banned by the Indian government and primarily operates in Jammu and Kashmir.
**Police**

India’s police-to-population ratio is dangerously low, reflecting a critical need for more manpower. Whereas the international peacetime police-to-population ratio is 270 police per 100,000 people, India’s is 130 police. In addition to this manpower shortage, India’s local, state, and federal police forces face internal politicization and external recruiting challenges. Hiring is often a non-transparent process that features assignments made for political purposes rather than qualifications, leading to poor organizational leadership. Moreover, promotions are not necessarily meritocratic; the influence of domestic politics and politicians in the affairs of India’s police is significant. In regards to recruiting, there is little incentive for citizens to become police officers, given the challenges of the career, poor pay, and little opportunity for merit-based advancement. For India’s brightest students, the private sector holds far more appeal than law enforcement.

**Paramilitary**

Paramilitary groups include the Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, the Central Industrial Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Assam Rifles, Sashastra Seema Bal (Armed Border Force), and National Security Guard. Given the strength of federal paramilitary forces, many states have neglected the development of their own internal security forces in lieu of relying on central law enforcement.

- The military also has a National Security Guard unit that specializes in responses to terrorism and hostage incidents.
- The Central Industrial Security Forces can be deployed to secure private industrial sites. The National Security Guard has been authorized to requisition aircraft to respond to emergencies across the country.

- India also possesses specialized forces for Naxalite counterinsurgency. The Greyhound force was formed in 1987, originating from the Andhra Pradesh police. Unlike regular police forces, the Greyhounds have superior training, equipment, support, and funding. Based on the initial success of Greyhound operations, the Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) were formed to expand anti-Naxalite efforts.

**Intelligence**

With roughly 20 disparate organizations across its entire infrastructure, India’s intelligence capabilities are a work in progress. Led by Syed Asif Ibrahim, the Intelligence Bureau, a division of the Home Affairs Ministry, is India’s largest and most crucial intelligence organization, a lynchpin of federal intelligence. In conjunction with the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau is responsible for collecting intelligence, while working with the Joint Intelligence Committee to produce analysis. Despite its importance, the Intelligence Bureau faces a 30% vacancy rate and, similar to India’s police, struggles to recruit new talent. With manpower shortages, the Intelligence Bureau – along with India’s overall intelligence infrastructure
- faces serious challenges to threat prevention. The Research and Analysis Wing and the Central Bureau of Investigation are both subordinate to the prime minister. Another initiative, the National Intelligence Grid, is attached to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

- Plans for a National Counter-Terrorism Centre have been prevented from coming to fruition, despite approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security. Chief Ministers from various states have echoed concerns that despite the increased effort in combatting terrorism, the NCTC will likely threaten states’ rights. NCTC personnel will be able to carry out operations and arrests without the permission of the state they are deployed to, while requiring state authorities to disclose all information on request – regardless of confidentiality.

- In reality, much of the responsibility in combating terrorism falls upon state and local authorities, who must cooperate with federal authorities through joint bureaus, task forces, and committees.

#### India’s Intelligence Agencies

![Diagram of India’s Intelligence Agencies]

#### Structure of Indian Security Apparatus

![Diagram of Structure of Indian Security Apparatus]
Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Like China, India has a huge network of critical infrastructure that requires security. Airports, power plants, nuclear plants, and gas pipelines all exist in some of the most dangerous parts of the country.

Of particular importance to India is its need to protect its large and growing nuclear industry. The country has also planned an ambitious program to develop nuclear power plants to provide no-emission energy. At the moment, roughly 70 percent of India’s electricity is generated by coal-fired plants; nuclear-power plants, consisting of 20 reactors made with technology from Russia, GE, and Canada, generated, in 2011, only 3.7 percent of the country’s electricity. However, India’s nuclear power program has recently run into political obstacles because the Parliament has proposed legislation that would make foreign vendors liable for their equipment. Before this political obstacle is removed, it is unlikely that foreign nuclear equipment suppliers will make significant moves in India.

Another high-value infrastructural network is India’s gas pipelines, which traverse some areas with active terrorist or separatist groups.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is currently the only government force protecting the entirety of India’s critical infrastructure. Headquartered in New Delhi, the CISF reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs and protects all industrial sites within the country, such as India’s airports, nuclear installations, space establishments, sea ports, power plants, and major government buildings. It is one of the largest paramilitary forces in the world. The CISF also takes on private security jobs, and currently protects the corporate owned Delhi metro. In addition, the CISF offers security and fire protection consulting services. Roughly 21,000 CISF men and officers have been deployed in 59 airports, and the CISF will be based in an additional 39 airports within the next three years. On average, the CISF receives 150 requests a year for security provision. The organization is known for being so tech savvy that Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde recently suggested that they lead India’s fight against terrorism.

Some states, such as Karnataka, are interested in developing their own industrial security apparatus. Karnataka is home to the Sea Bird Naval base and the Kaiga nuclear power plant. After having received terrorist threats earlier in the year, the state bulked up its security, adding coastal and state police to the 1,000 CISF men already stationed. Recently, Karnataka’s state government declared its intention to build three battalions of 2,000 personnel in a new Karnataka State Industrial Security Force. Other states may follow. Overall, India’s CISF appears to be a reliable organization for providing the security that India’s critical infrastructure will need in the coming future. Yet, in order to stay sharp, the Central Industrial Security Force will need to invest in up-and-coming technologies and continue to maintain innovation in its approach to security.

Airports

India’s air passenger volume in 2011 totaled 121.26 million, a 14.9% increase from the previous year’s figure of 105.56 million. As of 2013, there are 66 public airports throughout the nation. The three most active airports in India are Indira Gandhi International, Chhatrapati Shivaji International, and Chennai International. Indira Gandhi International served 26,786,952 passengers in Delhi over the course of 2011. In Mumbai, Chhatrapati Shivaji International followed with 22,948,632. Chennai International accommodated 9,701,498 passengers in the same year.
Subways
Though a number of rail transit projects in India are underway in the planning and construction phases, only four systems remain operational at the moment. The oldest of them, the Kolkata Metro, has a single line in use that is 25.135 km long covering 23 stations. An additional line in progress will add a 14.58 km corridor and 12 stations. As of early 2013, the Kolkata Metro receives 600,0000 passengers per weekday.

“Another high-value infrastructural network is India’s gas pipelines, which traverse some areas with active terrorist or separatist groups.”
The Delhi Metro has six lines and 143 stations over a total route of 189.63 km. Daily passenger volume on the Delhi Metro is approximately 1.9 million as of mid-2012. A 140 km expansion is currently in construction, with a completion deadline of 2016.

The Chennai Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS) currently spans 20km, with routes from Chennai Beach to Mylapore and Mylapore to Velachery. Another project currently under construction in Chennai, the Chennai Metro, will add two corridors totaling 45.1 km. After completion, commuters will have rapid transit access to the Chennai International Airport, Washermenpet, and St. Thomas Mountain. Current passenger traffic on the Chennai MRTS reaches 80,000 on a daily basis.

The Namma Metro in Bangalore currently has 42 stations over two lines totaling 42.3 kilometers. On weekdays, the Namma Metro typically receives 20,000 to 30,000 passengers, though weekends often generate twice the traffic.

Mumbai has yet to commence metro operations, though a trial run on the Mumbai Metro was first made on May 1, 2013. It is anticipated that safety certifications will be completed by the end of 2013, allowing passengers to use the completed 11.4 km Versova-Andheri-Ghatkopar corridor. In addition, the Japanese government has agreed to loan 71 billion yen for a 33 km expansion of the Mumbai Metro.

**Ram Pradhan Report**

In the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the Ram Pradhan Committee began investigating the government’s security competency. The results were worrisome.

Among many things, the committee’s report revealed a failure of intelligence organizations to assimilate and analyze information generated and a willful ignorance of the changing threat landscape. In the police force, assignments were frequently made for political purposes, and the police was not prepared to provide effective first-response to the attacks. Local army contingents arrived first, a full five hours later, shortly followed by the Marine Commandos. The elite National Security Guards (NSG) appeared five hours afterwards. The NSG, meant to be India’s rapid reaction force, is typically used for VIP security; on the day of the attacks, they embarrassingly had to take a bus to the site of the attack. Their one helicopter was not capable of navigating traffic.
The Problem of Underfunding

The NSG is not the only Indian force facing equipment shortages. There are only 100,000 bulletproof vests for police and paramilitary forces in all of India. India’s Quick Response Team stopped doing live ammunition training after September 2007 due to a shortage of ammunition.\textsuperscript{37} No matter how many response forces are put together, without equipment, India’s defense against terrorism is futile. Reform will be an arduous and difficult process, but in light of the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2008, it is necessary. The police force must be made apolitical in order to do its job effectively; institutions need to better coordinate intelligence within and between the federal and state governments; and the government must be willing to adapt to the changing threat landscape. Furthermore, remedying deficiencies in manpower, equipment, and training is crucial to meeting existing and future internal security challenges.

Given the manpower shortages facing some of the country’s most significant organizations – the Intelligence Bureau and police forces – we have yet to see India’s counter-terrorism infrastructure at full operational power. Going forward, India must incentivize its citizens to join its security and intelligence forces.

Conclusion

As a democracy with limited resources, India has shown its resilience in face of these tough challenges. Terrorist attacks and ethnic violence have led to thousands of deaths, but have not succeeded in fundamentally undermining India’s democratic institutions. In all likelihood, these domestic security threats will continue to strain India’s resources and capabilities since there are no quick solutions.
Endnotes

12. Terrorist Group.
31 http://chennaimetrorail.gov.in/project.php
33 http://bmrc.co.in/Network.htm
Japan
Country Report 2013
Japan at a glance

Total GDP (2011 - nominal): $5.867 trillion
Per Capita GDP (2012): $45,903
Population: 127,253,075 (2013 estimate)
Urban Population as percentage of total population: 67%
Major Ethnic Groups: Japanese (98.5%), Korean (0.5%), Chinese (0.4%)
Median Age of Population: 45.8 years
Number of Police per 100,000: 201.2
Defense Spending: $59.3 billion
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 1%

Introduction

As the world’s third-largest economy and a close ally of the United States, Japan plays a critical role in East Asia’s peace and prosperity. However, Japan faces multiple challenges on its national security front. The two decades of economic stagnation since the bursting of the Japanese economic bubble in the early 1990s have severely reduced the funding available for its defense and security. In the same period, North Korea has become a nuclear-armed rouge state constantly threatening its neighbors with provocations and aggressive acts. China’s defense modernization and territorial disputes with Japan have contributed to a worsening of relations between Tokyo and Beijing. Internally, Japanese politics has been in turmoil, with frequent changes of governments and weak political leadership. The election of Shinzo Abe as Japan’s new prime minister and the return of the Liberal Democratic Party to power in September 2012 provided an opportunity for Japan to revive its economy and make its government function effectively again.

In terms of its national security, Japan’s most urgent tasks in the coming decade consist of strengthening its ties with the United States, stabilizing relations with China, developing capabilities and contingency plans to respond to provocations from North Korea, and coping with the aftermaths of the Fukushima nuclear disaster that threaten Japan’s energy security.

This survey provides a brief examination of Japan’s external security environment, analyzes the country’s domestic security challenges, and describes the organization of Japan’s internal security institutions.
Japan’s External Security Environment

Japan is a close ally of the United States and a key actor in the security of the Asian-Pacific region. In addition to providing bases and staging grounds for the US military, Japan’s economic and military strengths help maintain the strategic balance in East Asia. Aside from participation in international and ASEAN dialogues, Japan has also taken a proactive approach to improving the security of some of the nations in Asia. For example, through its overseas development aid programs, Japan has helped Vietnam and Indonesia to purchase equipment necessary for homeland security, such as detection equipment at airports and borders.

Japan’s growing profile in international security affairs can also be a source of contention, particularly with China. In recent years, in response to China’s rising military strengths, Japan has begun to change its national security strategy and strengthen security ties with the United States. For decades, Japan had not offered any foreign military aid. This changed in 2012 when Tokyo provided training for Cambodian and East Timorese troops. Japan has also announced another critical policy change: it will enter the arms market by allowing exports of military equipment and parts. At present, Japan is in the process of aiding the development and equipping of other nations’ coast guards, including a deal to sell cutters to the Philippine Coast Guard. Japanese officials have downplayed the motivation to compete with China’s influence in their foreign policy strategy, even as they seek to strengthen ties with nations that are concerned about Chinese power.

North Korea’s recent aggressive actions have further worsened Japan’s security environment. Along with South Korea, Japan falls upon the first lines of defense if tensions on the Korean peninsula should escalate into armed conflict. Japan has also been a victim of kidnappings and espionage efforts perpetrated by North Korea.

The brightest spot in Japan’s external security environment is clearly the unprecedented level of cooperation between the United States and Japan on security issues. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is an effort to upgrade military cooperation between the United States and Japan started in 2002. The DPRI created provisions for roles and responsibilities, as well as communication and cooperative command, between American and Japanese forces. In addition, the DPRI’s other goals include missile defense and American personnel reduction in Okinawa, which was accomplished by moving Marines to Guam.

Japan has also offered financial and logistical support in the global war on terror. The Japanese government has provided over $5 billion in financial aid to Afghanistan to improve vocational training, rural development, health, education, agriculture, and infrastructure. In Operation Enduring Freedom, Maritime Self Defense Force vessels assisted in refueling tasks for allied forces. Japan also has extradition treaties with the United States and South Korea.

Furthermore, Japan is in line to purchase some of the U.S.’s most advanced weapon systems, such as the F-35 stealth fighter. A significant portion of Japan’s current military equipment is imported from the U.S., such as the UH-60JA, UH-60J, CH-47JA, TH-480B, SH-60, and AH-64D helicopters. Japan has also purchased Patriot missile defense systems and recently deployed them in anticipation of North Korean missile tests.

After the tsunami and subsequent disaster at Fukushima in March 2011, the United States military participated in a massive relief effort, Operation Tomodachi. In total, over 20,000 US personnel were dispatched along with aircraft and ships. As a result, the Japanese received assistance in logistics, damage control, monitoring, humanitarian aid, equipment, and training. The operation greatly improved the public image of the U.S. military in Japan.
Long-standing territorial disputes with China and South, Korea have periodically flared up in recent years. Japan announced in September 2012 that it would buy three of the Senkaku (Diaoyu to the Chinese) Islands. Consequently, violent anti-Japanese protests erupted in China. Beijing also raised stakes by sending official vessels into the territorial waters of the disputed islands. In one ominous incident, a Chinese naval ship allegedly locked its fire control radar on a Japanese ship. Despite worries about a possible accidental confrontation between Japan and China over these islands, the risks of a full-blown military conflict remain low.

Japan still contests South Korea’s claim to the Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands. After President Syngman Rhee’s maritime sovereignty declaration in 1952, South Korea occupied the islands and established a garrison. Afterwards, Japan experienced hostile encounters with Korean forces. The South Korean government has remained unreceptive to the idea of making concessions on the islands, while the Korean public has reacted with disapproval towards Japan’s celebration of Takeshima Day, a national holiday memorializing the territorial conflict between South Korea and Japan.

The Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) were originally inhabited by the Japanese. The Soviet occupation of the islands resulted in massive deportation of all Japanese residents at the end of World War II. While Russia offered to return one of the islands in 1956, Japan declined the deal and insisted on reclaiming all of them. The disputes remain unresolved.

While the United States is a neutral party in Japan’s territorial disputes (it does not take a position on the ownership of the disputed islands), it remains supportive of Japan. Washington has publicly declared that it opposes China’s unilateral actions and that the U.S.-Japan security treaty covers the disputed islands.

“Despite worries about a possible accidental confrontation between Japan and China over these islands, the risks of a full-blown military conflict remain low.”
Domestic Security and Terrorist Threats

Japan is one of the safest societies in the world, with very low crime rates and strict control of firearms. Security measures taken to protect government buildings may seem relatively light in comparison with the U.S. Unlike other regions in the Asia-Pacific, Japan does not face a significant terrorist threat. While bombings and various other attacks have been carried out in the past, they generally consisted of small-scale attacks that failed to produce human casualties or a significant amount of property damage.

One unique aspect of terrorist attacks in Japan stands out: the use of chemical and biological agents. The most well-known was Aum Shinrikyo’s 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which killed 12 and injured 5,500. However, the cult behind the attack has become largely inactive following a leadership dispute in 2003 and the conviction of its leader. Other lethal terrorist attacks in Japan include the 1994 Matsumoto sarin attack that injured 600 and killed seven; the 1998 Wakayama arsenic incident which injured 67 and killed four. While a number of groups (such as Hotaru or the Japanese Red Army) existed at one point, many have been disbanded or declared inactive by the government. Many perpetrators of recent attacks remain unidentified, while none of the attacks after year 2000 have produced any human casualties. Nevertheless, the Japanese government has taken steps to respond to chemical attacks by terrorists. Such measures including training programs to respond to nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks and the establishment of a National Antiterrorism Office within the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.

While there is a small Muslim population in Japan, any future threat posed by fundamentalist Islam is purely speculative. No unrest has occurred, and Muslim presence in Japan has received a greater level of tolerance relative to that of other western nations.

Organization of National and Internal Security

Japan has an impressive and sophisticated security apparatus. Its array of intelligence organizations includes the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence and Analysis Service, the Ministry of Defense’s Defense Intelligence Headquarters, the Metropolitan Police Department’s Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Division, the National Police Agency Security Bureau, and the Public Security Intelligence Agency.

- The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office functions as a central intelligence group, while the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center is responsible for collecting and analyzing satellite images.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs branch handles collection of foreign intelligence.
- The Metropolitan Police Department gathers domestic intelligence.
- The Security Bureau is in charge of investigating foreigners and radical groups, as well as North Korean counterintelligence efforts. The Public Security Intelligence Agency is tasked with observing international terrorist activity.
- The Defense Intelligence Headquarters specializes in monitoring communications and conducting signals intelligence.

“One unique aspect of terrorist attacks in Japan stands out: the use of chemical and biological agents.”
Ministry of Defense

Renamed in 2007, the Japanese Ministry of Defense is the agency responsible for overseeing the various branches of the Japanese Self Defense Forces, such as the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces. The Ministry of Defense is part of the Office of the Prime Minister. While the Prime Minister also has the authority to order SDF units into action, such decisions are subject to approval by the Diet (Japanese Legislature). The Director General holds the title of Minister of State and heads the Ministry of Defense. The Director General is assisted by two vice ministers (Parliamentary and Administrative) and is advised by a Joint Staff Council that consists of a chairman and the chiefs of staff from the various uniformed branches of the Self Defense Forces.

Civilian authority in the Ministry of Defense is established through its various bureaus. They include the Minister’s Secretariat and the Bureaus of Defense Policy, Operational Policy, Personnel and Training, Finance and Equipment, and Local Cooperation. Each bureau is headed by officials from other government ministries and assigned distinct missions.

The Other organizations under the Ministry of Defense include the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Technical Research and Development Institute, and Central Procurement Office.

National Police Agency

The National Police Agency (NPA) and National Public Safety Commission make up Japan’s national law enforcement apparatus. The commission is responsible for administration of the NPA, including the appointments of the NPA Commissioner General and prefectural police officials. Members of the commission appointed by the Prime Minister and approved by members of the Diet, while the chairman is a state minister. However, members must not have served in law enforcement within the last five years. Furthermore, there is a limit on political party membership in the commission – no more than two members in the same party are allowed to serve simultaneously.

Responsibilities of the NPA include planning and research, budgetary decisions, communication, administration, and training. The NPA also conducts traffic regulation on national highways, investigation into organized crime, as well as domestic and international emergency relief and response activities.

The NPA’s subordinate bureaus are the Commissioner General’s Secretariat, Community Safety Bureau, Criminal Investigation Bureau, Traffic Bureau, Security Bureau, and Info-Communications Bureau. Organizations attached to the NPA consist of the National Police Academy, National Research Institute of Police Science, and Imperial Guard Headquarters.

There are also seven Regional Police Bureaus (RPBs) subordinate to the NPA. Each bureau has jurisdiction over the prefectural police organizations within its borders. However, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department and Hokkaido police are separate from the regional bureaus. Each Regional Police Bureau is headed by a Director General who supervises the operations of prefectural police within the RPB’s jurisdiction.
Each prefecture has its own Prefectural Public Safety Commission and police headquarters. The Prefectural Public Safety Commissions are appointed by the prefectural governor. Each commission has three to five members, who are selected with similar criteria to that of the National Public Safety Commission - there are restrictions on their political affiliations and career in law enforcement. The Commission is in charge of administering and formulating regulations for the prefectural police, as well as issuing driver’s licenses, entertainment business licenses, and firearm licenses. While prefectural police agencies are autonomous of each other, they may cooperate or request help from the NPA when dealing with major or cross-border incidents.

Tokyo has its own Metropolitan Police Department, which operates similarly to prefectural police headquarters. The MPD is led by the Superintendent General, who is appointed by the National Public Safety Commission, with approval and consent from the Prime Minister and Tokyo Metropolitan Safety Commission.

The MPD and prefectural police have also apportioned their respective jurisdictions into individual districts. Each district has a police station and station chief. In addition, there are smaller units or police boxes (known as Koban and Chuzaisho) that operate in station subdistricts. These subunits serve as community liaisons between citizens and

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**Nuclear Security**

The Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) is responsible for the licensing of nuclear reactors. Japan’s main laws governing nuclear power are the Atomic Energy Basic Act and Reactor Regulation Act.32

Following the accident at Fukushima in March 2011, the Japanese Nuclear Regulation Authority was established on March 11, 2011. Its incorporated administrative agencies include the Japan Nuclear Safety Organization, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, and the National Institute of Radiological Sciences.33

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency was established in October 2005 from the merger of the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute.34 The JAEA is responsible for a variety of tasks, mostly related to research into nuclear energy, though it is also responsible for studying and analyzing safety regulations, disaster prevention, and international proliferation.35 The JAEA’s executive positions consist of a president, vice president, as well as executive directors. The JAEA’s main divisions are a R&D Directorate, R&D Institutes/Centers, Project Promotion Sector, and Management Sector.36


The Nuclear Emergency Response and Preparedness Department is the division responsible for planning, coordinating, and analyzing
emergency responses at nuclear facilities. The JNES maintains and provides equipment at various off-site centers across Japan. These facilities serve as local emergency response headquarters during disaster scenarios. The JNES also has access to the Emergency Response Support System, a network connected to nuclear facilities that allows authorities to monitor data and assess situations. The JNES is also responsible for conducting and evaluating training exercises for first responders in nuclear incidents.38

Japan’s nuclear facilities generally employ their own private unarmed security forces, despite concerns over terrorist threats.39 Current Japanese laws prohibit civilian security personnel from bearing arms.40 While the national police have dispatched armed security details to safeguard reactors in 2002, the police’s responsibility with regards to Japan’s nuclear safety mainly lies in disaster and emergency response. The Fukushima reactors were protected by a surveillance system installed by an Israeli firm, Magna BSP.41 Magna BSP has stated that it is also working on an agreement to provide such security systems for all of Japan’s nuclear reactors.

Japan currently has two nuclear reprocessing plants. Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited runs the Rokkasho plant, while the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency manages Tokai. Though the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Aomori prefecture, which cost more than $20 billion to build, is the larger of the two, it is currently incomplete and continues to undergo testing. At full capacity, the facility can reprocess 800 tons of spent fuel and 130 tons of mixed oxide fuel annually. Rokkasho can also store up to 3,000 tons of spent fuel across its three spent fuel pools, in addition to being a site for storage of high-level radioactive waste.42

The Tokai Reprocessing Plant, located in Ibaraki, is currently reprocessing 210 tons of spent fuel per year.43 The plant can contain up to 140 tons of spent fuel in its storage pool.44

Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Airports

In Japan, there are 97 Airports open to the public. Of these, five are designated as Class 1, or major airports that primarily serve international flights. There are another 24 major airports designated as Class 2. There are 53 Class 3 airports, which are local airports used for domestic air traffic. Furthermore, there is an “other” category which includes airports that are managed by defense agencies and the United States military.45

Japan’s three busiest airports are Haneda, Narita, and New Chitose. Both Haneda and Narita service the Greater Tokyo Area and New Chitose operates out of the Sapporo metropolitan region. Haneda experienced the greatest volume in 2011, serving a total of 62,263,025 passengers. Narita and New Chitose had 28,055,772 and 15,773,073 passengers respectively.46 Overall, Japan saw a 13.3% decrease in yearly passenger totals from 2010 to 2011. In 2010, 92,375,078 passengers passed through Japan via international and domestic flights. A year later, the number of air passengers fell to 80,055,905.47

Japanese airports have their own police stations, which fall within the jurisdiction of their respective prefectural police agencies. Thus, security is the concern of any private security forces and the local police. Narita Airport Police is responsible for the security of Narita Airport, the most important hub of the nation.
Mass Transit Systems: Subways

The Tokyo Metro is the largest metro rail system in Japan. It contains 179 stations over a total operational route length of 195.1 km. There are nine lines, which range from 14 to 31 km each. As of fall 2011, an average of 6.22 million passengers use the Tokyo Metro on a daily basis. The next two largest rail systems are located in Osaka and Nagoya. The Osaka Municipal Subway has eight lines and 123 stations over a 130 km route. The Nagoya Municipal Subway contains 93 stations across five lines totaling 87 km.

Energy Industry Infrastructure

Major Gas Companies include:

- Tokyo Gas: provides natural gas to consumers over a 59,575 km network. The network services the cities of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Ibaaki, Tochigi, and Gunma.
- Toho Gas: supplies the Aichi, Gifu, and Mie prefectures over a 28,000+ km network.
- Osaka Gas: services the Kansai region. The network extends 60,000 km and has terminals at Himeji and Senboku.
- Saibu Gas: provides natural gas to the Fukuoka, Kitakyushu, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Shimabara, and Sasebo areas.
- Japan Petroleum Exploration: has an 826km LNG pipeline network that serves the Hokkaido, Akita, Tohoku, and Hokoriku areas.
- INPEX: operates the Minami-Nagaoka Gas Field, which has a 1400km pipeline network that services the Kanto and Koshinetsu regions surrounding Tokyo.

Summary

The high degree of organization and effectiveness of the Japanese internal security apparatus and the unique homogeneity of its population have made Japan a safe and stable society. Its alliance with the United States provides a dependable shield against external threats. The terrorist threats it faces in the future will be largely foreign, considering the unlikely return of extremist religious sects such as Aum Shinrikyo. The most vulnerability targets will likely be Japan’s mass transit systems because successful attacks against them can produce huge disruptive effects at relatively low cost. Protecting these soft targets will remain the most difficult challenge for the Japanese government. A second challenge is to guard Japan’s large stockpile of reprocessed nuclear fuel. At the moment, tight security measures in Japan’s reprocessing facilities make theft or violent assault a distant possibility. But new investments in perimeter defense will almost certainly add more margins to security.
Endnotes

1 https://data.worldbank.org/country/japan


5 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS


10 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4142.htm

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27 http://start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organizations_by_country.asp?id=JA

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33 http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/outline/
Korea at a glance

Total GDP (2011 – nominal): $1.116 trillion
Per Capita GDP (2011): $22,424¹
Population: 49,955,203 (2013 estimate)
Urban Population as a percentage of total population: 83%
Major Ethnic Groups: Homogeneous (except for 20,000 Chinese)
Median Age of Population: 39.7 years²
Number of Police per 100,000: 202.1³
Defense Spending: $31.7 billion
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 2.7%⁴

The Republic of Korea:
Confronting State-Sponsored Terrorist Threats

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is undoubtedly one of the most successful stories in post-WWII economic development and political transition. Within four decades, the country has recovered from a devastating war, achieved one of the true economic miracles of our time, and managed a peaceful regime transition from military rule to democracy. As the country is poised to surpass its former colonial master, Japan, in per capita income, South Korea finds itself confronting an increasingly unstable external environment. The primary source of threat to ROK is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea. The isolated Stalinist regime in Pyongyang has acquired a rudimentary nuclear arsenal and medium-range delivery systems. Its current ruler is a young man in his late 20s who succeeded his late father in 2011 and has since shown a similar tendency to use nuclear and missile blackmail to try to gain concessions from the United States and ROK.

Because of North Korea’s record of aggressions, ROK’s national security and internal security organizations are tasked almost solely to address the threat from Pyongyang. Except for state-sponsored terrorist acts and overt military attacks from DPRK (such as the sinking of an ROK warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 and the artillery bombardment of a South Korean island in November 2010), ROK faces practically no internal security threats. One of the most homogenous societies in the world, ROK has no ethnic minorities or ethnic conflict (although regional divisions exist and influence politics). Social conflicts, which used to be reflected in tense relations between capital and labor, remain subdued, thanks mainly to the ability of ROK’s new democratic regime to facilitate social compromises and provide sufficient social protection to moderate class conflicts.

If ROK’s domestic security situation is relatively benign, its external environment has deteriorated significantly in the last few years. The DPRK’s regime under the late dictator Kim Jong-il became more aggressive and provocative. It conducted its third nuclear test in February 2013, almost six and half years after its first nuclear test in October 2006. In addition, Pyongyang kept testing its long-range missiles. Although DPRK achieved a partial success in testing its long-range rockets (in December 2012), such tests have raised regional tensions, further isolating Pyongyang and driving a wedge between Seoul and Beijing, which has been unable to rein in its troublesome client state, North Korea. One expected beneficial outcome from the deterioration of the stability on the Korean Peninsula is the improvement in ROK-US relations. Seoul and Washington have grown much closer during this
period of rising tensions with Pyongyang. President Lee Myung-bak, who has followed a tough stance on North Korea, has greatly strengthened Seoul’s security alliance with Washington during his five-year term in office.

With the election of Park Geun-hye, ROK’s first female president, Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang is poised for adjustment, if not dramatic shift. Park campaigned on a platform promising some unspecified policy change toward DPRK to achieve reconciliation. However, the record of previous efforts by Seoul to achieve reconciliation with Pyongyang has not been encouraging.Former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun both tried to encourage Kim Jong-il to behave more responsibly and give up his nuclear weapons with the so-called “Sunshine Policy,” neither had much to show for their efforts.

In the coming decade, the most critical variable in South Korea’s national security equation will continue to be the stability and behavior of DPRK’s regime. Although DPRK’s new leader, Kim Jong-un, seems to be consolidating power, his control of the regime’s security forces and DPRK’s military remains far from assured. In the meantime, DPRK’s economy is in a precarious shape, totally dependent on China for aid and trade. The relative political weakness of Kim Jong-un and DPRK’s economic fragility suggest two principal causes of instability on the Korean Peninsula in the coming decade. The first is a probable internal implosion caused by a power struggle to topple the young Kim. The other is an economic collapse, which could be caused by a reduction of Chinese aid or by continued economic mismanagement.

For South Korea, therefore, the most prudent national security strategy will be maintaining its current course. On the one hand, Seoul will rely on the ROK-U.S. military alliance to provide the main source of security. On the other hand, Seoul will continue to seek China’s cooperation in keeping DPRK under control and try limited measures to entice Pyongyang to behave within certain limits (such as refraining from direct military attacks on South Korea). Given the strategic constraints imposed on Seoul, its national security policy in the foreseeable future will be largely reactive, not proactive.

**South Korea’s National and Internal Security Apparatus**

Due to the military and state-organized terrorist threats from DPRK, ROK devotes a significant portion of its national income to national defense. According to CIA, its defense spending is around 2.7 percent of GDP, much higher than Japan’s (1 percent of GDP). Annual increases in defense spending are at a constant of 3 percent a year. In 2011, total defense spending was about $29 billion. Of this amount, roughly $12 billion was spent on personnel, $8 billion on operations and maintenance, $7 billion on procurement, and $2 billion on defense R&D and investment.

The ROK military has roughly 640,000 men and women in three branches. The largest branch, the army, has over 500,000. The navy and the air force have, respectively 68,000 and 65,000 each. The military is commanded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman of which is almost always from the Army; above the Joint Chiefs is the Minister of National Defense, and then ultimately the President. The U.S. Eighth Army, which is stationed in ROK, is part of the Korean-American Combined Forces Command.

Within the military are a number of specialized counter-terrorism units. ROK Army’s 707th Special Missions Battalion is tasked with quick reaction, special operations, and counter-terrorism particularly in urban settings. It responds to land-based and aviation attacks. According to SpecWar.net, the battalion is composed of 300 soldiers divided into six companies, two of which are responsible for anti-terrorism; these two companies have four 14-man teams each. Support and demolition teams are also part of the 707th Special Missions Battalion.
In the Navy, the SEALs are tasked with anti-terrorism operations at sea. In addition, the CBRNE Special Force battalion, directed by the Military CBRN Defense Command, is available to counter CBRN threats. There are additional CBRN response teams at the division and corps levels throughout the military, and the National 119 Rescue Service operates a CBRN team as well.

Of ROK’s specialized national and internal security agencies, the following list includes the most critical organizations tasked to deal with the threat from DPRK.

- **The National Intelligence Service (NIS):** this is ROK’s equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency; it is under the direct control of the President. The agency’s duties, according to the National Intelligence Service Act, include (1) the collection, preparation, and distribution of intelligence to oppose espionage, subversion, terrorism, communism, and international crime; (2) the protection of classified documents, sensitive materials, high-security facilities, and restricted areas; (3) the investigation of crimes against the nation, including treason and insurrection; (4) criminal investigation related to NIS staff missions; and (5) the coordination and formulation of intelligence and security affairs and policy. The NIS is headed by a director, who is assisted by three deputy chiefs. The first deputy director oversees external intelligence and matters relating to North Korea; the second is responsible for anti-espionage and domestic operations; the third for industrial and science matters, cyber security, and special affairs.

  - The NIS-run Terrorism Information Integration Center (TIIC) gathers intelligence on terrorist activity and sends out early warnings to relevant bodies.

- **The Korea Center for Disease and Prevention (KCDP) under the Ministry of Health and Welfare** runs a bioterrorism division that conducts surveillance on bioterror threats.

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**Specialized Security Forces**

Such forces include the Riot Police, formerly the Combat Police. It is in charge of anti-riot operations. In May 2013 the Riot Police blocked a civic group from launching leaflets across the border into North Korea. Another specialized unit is Unit 868, a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team. Its main mission is counter-terrorism. In March 2011, both Riot and SWAT police units were deployed to patrol South Korean city streets and subways in response to aggressive North Korean posturing.

Other specialized counter-terrorism units within the NPA consist of the Seoul Police unit and 6 other local units. The Seoul unit is composed of 4 tactical action teams plus personnel guard, EOD, and support teams, a total of just over 100 elite members.
• The Defense Security Command (DSC): this is an organization in the Ministry of National Defense responsible for detecting North Korean infiltration, espionage, and subversion of the South Korean military. The DSC investigates members of the military who are suspected of espionage or treasonous acts.

• The National Police Agency (NPA): this is ROK’s national police organization and performs the nation’s routine law and order functions. It is headed by a commissioner general, who is assisted by a deputy commissioner general. In addition, there are seven directors general heading seven different bureaus (including bureaus for Intelligence and National Security) and 4 other departments. There are also 16 local police agencies that divide up local security duties. ROK has a total of 249 police stations that administer 1,517 police outposts. A police outpost is a first-line organizational unit of Korean police work – a team of officers assigned to a specific given locality for the purpose of preventing and responding to crime and maintaining security. Officers are closely familiar with the area their box polices, and with the people living and working in it. In 2012, the Korean police force was 10,386 strong.

• The ROK Coast Guard is not a part of the military, and is instead administered by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Among its duties are the protection of South Korea’s Exclusive Economic Zone, coastline, ports, and harbors, and the detection of North Korean vessels (or any other sponsor of terrorism) and vessels carrying hazardous materials. The Coast Guard operates 16 stations around the Korean coastline with East, West, South, and Jeju headquarters. To heighten response capacities and integration it trains with the ROK Navy and the NPA. As of 2012 the Coast Guard consisted of 10,095 members.

South Korea lacks an independent central authority on counter-terrorism. Instead, various organizations are charged with responding to different types of terrorist activity: the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission for nuclear and radiological terror; the Ministry of the Environment for chemical terror; the Ministry of Health and Welfare for biological terror; the Ministry of National Defense for attacks on military facilities; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport for aviation terror; the Coast Guard for maritime terror; the National Police Agency for traditional domestic terror; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for overseas terror. The heads of each agency come together with the NIS chief to form the standing committee of the National Anti-Terrorism Countermeasures Committee, one of the leading bodies responsible for making decisions on anti-terrorism measures. This system has been criticized by some for its ad-hoc nature.

"Integration of intelligence and of civil and military defense forces, as well as comprehensive institutional mechanisms to respond to terrorism, makes the South Korean security posture strong and effective."

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The National Crisis Management Guidelines provide for the mobilization of a response to crisis situations; a crisis management center based in the Blue House is operated by the National Security Office to oversee such responses. Routine security at crisis-vulnerable locations is carried out by military personnel - under the United Defense Act and various presidential decrees, the military secures the outer perimeter of first-class important facilities such as nuclear plants, international airports, seaports, major oil refineries, and water purification and supply centers. All of these facilities also employ private security forces, which in some cases – particularly at airports – coordinate with the NPA for emergency response. Defensive measures are applied based on a color-coded warning level.

Integration of intelligence and of civil and military defense forces, as well as comprehensive institutional mechanisms to respond to terrorism, makes the South Korean security posture strong and effective. Weaknesses remain, however, including the lack of a bill to prevent terrorism-related financial transactions and the need for specialized knowledge and expertise on CBRN threats. More advanced equipment is also required to face such threats.

North Korea’s Terrorist Attacks on ROK

Except for state-sponsored terrorist attacks from DPRK, ROK has not suffered any terrorist attacks from other sources. North Korean terrorism has typically aimed to disrupt South Korean society and government and create tension between the two countries to build public support in the South for dialogue and negotiation, and to push the South Korean government towards a more pro-North stance, which Pyongyang hopes will further its agenda of unification on its own terms. Thus, DPRK terrorist attacks often target ROK civilians or government officials. DPRK terrorist attacks on ROK civil aviation have been perpetrated twice – once in 1969, when an airplane was hijacked by a North Korean agent and flown to the North; and once in 1987, when a civilian aircraft exploded mid-flight, killing over 100. South Korean civilians have also been subjected to frequent kidnappings by Northern agents, for the most part fishermen who stray too close to the maritime border with the North. More than 480 South Koreans have been abducted by the North Korean government from South Korea since the 1950s; typically abductees are used to train spies in Southern language and customs, or are brainwashed to be used as spies themselves. When kidnappings are not random but targeted, the goal is to take advantage of some expertise or extract knowledge from the abductee. A recent trend in North Korean strategy has been to send agents across the border posing as escapees and defectors, so that they can infiltrate South Korean society.

"Except for state-sponsored terrorist attacks from DPRK, ROK has not suffered any terrorist attacks from other sources."
In 2009, all of Pyongyang’s agencies responsible for performing terrorist acts in South Korea were brought under the leadership of the new Reconnaissance General Bureau, which is controlled by the National Defense Commission. There are concerns that NDC oversight may induce greater militancy among North Korean agencies involved in terrorism; another worry is that competition for distinction and demonstration of loyalty between agencies encourages aggressive activity.

Below is an incomplete list of major terrorist and armed attacks launched by DPRK on ROK:

- January 1967, DPRK attacked a South Korean warship near border, killing 39 sailors.
- January 1968, DPRK commandos stormed presidential palace in Seoul, they failed to assassinate President Park Chung-hee. Instead, they shot his wife.
- January 1968, DPRK navy captured USS Pueblo, an unarmed American naval intelligence ship. One crew member died and 82 were held hostage for 11 months.
- December 1969, DPRK agents hijacked a South Korean airliner taking dozens of passengers hostage.
- October 1983, DPRK agents bombed a hotel in Rangoon, Burma, in a failed attempt to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan. Chun escaped unharmed, but most of his cabinet members died in the attack.
- November 1987, DPRK agents planted bombs on a South Korean airliner, killing 115.
- May 1992, three North Koreans disguised in South Korean uniforms were discovered and shot dead on South Korean territory, with three South Koreans wounded.
- October 1992, a 400-member North Korean spy ring was detected by the forerunner of the NIS. The ring’s mission was to establish a network for carrying out subversive activity against South Korea. It was determined that agents had infiltrated the South via its coastline.
- June 1994, North Korean agents attempted to kidnap a South Korean professor from an Ethiopian university in Addis Ababa.
- May 1995, a North Korean patrol vessel fired on South Korean fishermen, killing three.
- July 1995, a South Korean pastor in Manchuria was abducted by North Korean agents.
- October 1995, two armed North Koreans were found south of the Demilitarized Zone; one was shot while the other escaped back to the North.
- October 1995, two North Korean agents were discovered in west-central South Korea; one captured alive revealed that their aim was to contact anti-government groups in South Korea.
- July 1996, a North Korean spy who had posed as a professor in Seoul for 12 years was uncovered and captured. He suggested to police that scores or even hundreds of North Korean agents were operating in South Korea.
- September 1996, twenty-six North Korean military personnel disembarked from a submarine off the northeast coast of South Korea; most were killed with one captured and one escaped. Eleven South Koreans were killed.
- October 1996, a South Korean diplomat was murdered in Russia. North Korea was believed to be at fault.
- November 1997, South Korean intelligence uncovered a North Korean espionage ring in Seoul, totaling six agents including a noted academic.
- September 1999, the NIS arrested five members of a radical pro-North Korea group called the Revolutionary Party for People and Democracy. The group was reported to be receiving email instructions from Pyongyang.
- September 1999, a South Korean businessman was abducted by North Korean agents in Dandong, northeastern China.
• January 2000, a South Korean-American pastor was kidnapped by North Korean agents posing as defectors in northeastern China.
• March 2010, a DPRK midget submarine sank an ROK naval ship, killing 48 sailors.
• November 2010, DPRK artillery bombarded an ROK island, killing two marines and two civilians.

What this list shows is that the threat from DPRK to ROK’s internal security is significant and constant. The DPRK regime strikes both inside and outside ROK borders, and uses all imaginable methods and means. The targets of DPRK’s terrorist attacks include both ROK civilians and military units. Such threat thus necessitates a high degree of security alert and significant investment on the part of the ROK government.

The Changing Face of Security Threats

ROK national security maintains a strong emphasis on traditional, conventional threats emanating from North Korea, including state-sponsored terrorism in its established forms. Increasingly, however, the South Korean threat matrix is expanding to include non-traditional threats, in ways that the ROK security apparatus has not yet fully adapted to. Some of these have to do primarily with changes in North Korean strategy – infiltrations and local provocations have decreased in recent decades, for example, but the asymmetric threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and other WMD has risen significantly.

Most of the emerging threats, however, are byproducts of a changing society in the South. As South Korea has gone high-tech and become one of the most internet-connected societies in the world, vulnerability to cyber attacks is an increasing concern. These include both cyber-crimes and cyber-terrorism, and both types of attacks have been on the rise. The most common targets for such attacks are banks, in the case of the former, and government agencies, in the case of the latter. Official awareness of and response to cyber threats has grown, although budget constraints have limited the ROK government’s response.

Domestic and trans-national crime has also come to present an emerging threat, with social change and an increase in foreign residents, particularly foreign workers, changing the face of crime in South Korea. Violent crime has become a greater concern, white-collar crime is rising, and crimes committed by foreign workers have increased. Fears of domestic connections with international terror networks, especially among foreign residents, have grown. Transnational crimes that threaten trade or energy security, two areas in which South Korea is extremely vulnerable due to its external dependence, are another crucial part of the country’s broadening threat matrix. Such crimes include maritime piracy, smuggling, and drug and human trafficking.

The final component of the emerging security threats is bioterrorism. The possibility of North Korea employing chemical weapons to attack the South is a matter of great concern, and the government has focused on building early warning and emergency response systems, increasing public awareness, and stepping up surveillance and monitoring. In 2011 a network of 124 health centers around the country were assigned responsibility for conducting surveillance of bioterror threats.

Clearly South Korea has begun to adapt to a shifting security paradigm, but there is still a bias towards facing the North Korean conventional threat. The national security apparatus continues to adapt as the danger of emerging threats becomes more evident and the nation’s vulnerabilities more apparent.
Nuclear Security in Korea

ROK has 23 operating nuclear reactors that supply roughly 30 percent of the country’s electric power. Such high dependence on nuclear energy requires an elaborate regulatory and security system. By international standards, ROK has an impressive record of nuclear safety and security, thanks to the capabilities of its government and regulatory agencies.

In November 2011, perhaps as a result of the lessons learned from Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster in March that year, South Korea’s nuclear regulatory system was comprehensively overhauled. Regulatory power, previously dispersed through several organizations, was consolidated in the new ministry-level Nuclear Safety & Security Council (NSSC), an independent body reporting directly to the President. Responsibility for the physical protection of nuclear plants was assigned to the Nuclear Emergencies Division of the Radiation Emergency Bureau, one of two bureaus within the NSSC. The division is also charged with the protection of nuclear material, the training of professional security personnel, and the formulation of plans for preventing and responding to nuclear terrorism attacks. The NSSC is aided in its duties by two technical bodies, the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) and the Korean Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (KINAC), whose Physical Protection Division is responsible for the inspection of physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, the development and testing of physical protection equipment, and risk assessment of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear plants in South Korea are operated by the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Company (KHNP), a subsidiary of the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO). In April 2013, responding to fears of North Korean cyber attacks, KHNP disconnected all nuclear plants from the internet and also sealed off USB ports on facility computers.

"As South Korea has gone high-tech and become one of the most internet-connected societies in the world, vulnerability to cyber attacks is an increasing concern."
To further strengthen its nuclear security, ROK’s International Nuclear Security Academy, a training facility for physical protection of nuclear plants, will begin operation in 2014. The academy will contain a four-sector test bed for (1) testing sensors in use at Korean nuclear plants and training security personnel in the usage of physical protection system components; (2) training personnel in facility entry control; (3) testing new sensors and other technologies to evaluate their potential for future use in the physical protection regime; and (4) conducting especially destructive tests, in particular those related to the effects of terrorist attacks. KINAC will be charged with operation of the Academy.

"The Seoul Subway is one of the largest subway systems in the world."

Other Major Infrastructure

The Seoul Subway is one of the largest subway systems in the world. City-center Lines 1 through 4, operated by Seoul Metro, have a ridership of just over 4 million per day and total 276.95 km of track. In total, Seoul has 326.5 km of mass rapid transit track, and 975.4 km including commuter railways and the connecting 29.5 km single line of the Incheon subway. This extended network has a daily ridership of close to 7 million people. Besides Seoul and Incheon, four other South Korean cities have subway systems: Busan, with 131.8 km of track and an 877,000 daily ridership; Daegu with 53.9 km and 348,000; Daejeon, 22.6 km and 104,000; and Gwangju, 20.1 km and 49,300. Altogether South Korean subway lines run for 584.4 km and service roughly 8.3 million people on a daily average.

South Korea’s primary international airport, the Incheon International Airport servicing Seoul, has daily passenger traffic of 109,257 people. The Gimpo International Airport, also in Seoul, has 57,472 daily passengers. South Korea’s other six international airports, and their daily passenger count, are: Jeju (55,814), Gimhae (27,393), Cheongju (3,899), Daegu (3,243), Muan (306), and Yangyang (71). This makes for a total of 257,455 passengers using South Korea’s eight international airports every day, on average. The country’s largest domestic airport is Gwangju Airport, which handles 4,029 passengers per day. Other domestic airports, with passenger traffic, are: Yeosu (1,743), Ulsan (1,463), Pohang (740), Gunsan (492), Sacheon (392), and Wonju (241). In total, 9,100 passengers use seven domestic airports, and all airports in South Korea combined handle daily passengers numbering 266,555.
Protecting Soft Targets: An Urgent Task

The most important insight from this survey is that future state-sponsored terrorist attacks by North Korea on ROK will most likely strike soft targets, such as airports and subways. Such systems are difficult to defend and easy to infiltrate. Using conventional explosives, chemical or biological weapons, or cyber-attacks can cause costly disruptions, societal panic, and large numbers of casualties. For a regime that faces almost certain military retaliation from ROK and the U.S. if it engages in direct and overt violent attacks on hard targets, such as occurred in 2010, deploying agents to conduct terrorist operations against critical soft targets in ROK is a logical and tempting tactic if Pyongyang desires to escalate tensions.
Endnotes

1  http://data.worldbank.org/country/korea-republic
## Thailand at a glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP (2011 nominal)</td>
<td>$345.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (2011 nominal)</td>
<td>$4,9721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>67,448,120 (2013 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population as a percentage of total population</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Thai (75%), Chinese (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age of Population</td>
<td>35.1 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Police per 100,000</td>
<td>3213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Spending (2011, nominal conversion from LCU)</td>
<td>$5.432 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Spending (as percentage of GDP)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## National Security Environment

Despite its political turmoil in the past decade, Thailand remains an ally of the United States, reaffirmed as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” in 2003. Geographically and strategically, Thailand is important to the United States’ security objectives in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Thailand has provided support for US operations since the Korean and Vietnam wars, and more recently the peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. By granting the American military access to its bases and airfields, Thailand has also proved essential to facilitating disaster relief efforts in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 2008 Cyclone Nargis. In turn, the United States has provided military aid to Thailand through various programs, such as Excess Defense Article transfers, Foreign Military Financing, and International Military Education and Training.

The two nations conduct regular joint military exercises. Cobra Gold, billed as the largest multinational field exercise in the world, has taken place annually in Thailand for over 30 years, co-hosted by Thailand and the United States. In Bangkok, the United States operates a security assistance organization subordinate to the U.S. Ambassador, known as the Joint US Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI). Aside from running and coordinating training exercises, JUSMAGTHAI has also assisted in humanitarian and narcotics missions. Through the U.S. Agency for International Development, both countries have also been able to collaborate in public health and law enforcement efforts by combating HIV/AIDS, and human trafficking. However, there has been subtle shift in Thailand’s foreign relations since the late 1990s. Disappointed by the refusal of the U.S. to provide assistance during the East Asian financial crisis, Thailand subsequently began to strengthen its ties with China. Its economic and military relationships with China have grown significantly in the last decade.
Thailand has ongoing border disputes with Burma and Cambodia. Violence among Burmese factions has spilled into Thai territories. Occasionally, such incidents led to exchange of fire between the Thai and Burmese military forces. Burmese insurgents who seized a Thai hospital in 2000 called on the Thai government to cease its shelling of rebel targets in support of the Burmese junta. In 2011 the Thai government requested that Burma control its artillery fire after shells exploded near civilian sites on Thai soil. On occasion, Thai and Burmese forces have also appeared to have deliberately targeted each other outside of their counterinsurgency operations. In 2001, Burmese forces captured a Thai military base at Ban Pang Noon. The base was retaken by Thai forces after a subsequent artillery counterattack.

Cambodia has had similarly violent encounters in its contested area with Thailand, resulting in the deaths of soldiers and the displacement of civilians. The dispute between the two nations originated over a 1962 International Court of Justice ruling that declared the Preah Vihear temple as part of Cambodia. Although Thailand did not contest the ownership of the temple, the dispute centers on a patch of land adjacent to the temple. In 2013, the United Nations opened a new round of hearings in an attempt to resolve the conflict between the two countries, after the International Court of Justice formed a demilitarized zone around the temple two years prior.

Overall, Thailand’s external security environment remains benign. As a member of ASEAN and an American ally, Thailand faces negligible military threat from its neighbors. The territorial dispute with Cambodia is minor and can be resolved through diplomatic means. The challenges from the instability and violence in the border regions with Burma are tougher given the complexity of the conflict inside Burma. However, such skirmishes are unlikely to mushroom into large-scale military conflicts. Thailand’s real security challenges, as we will see below, come from instability inside Burma, political unrest and ethnic violence within its own borders.

Organization of Internal Security

Ministry of Justice

Thailand’s Ministry of Justice is responsible for administration and enforcement of the criminal and civil law. Its administrative departments include the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Rights and Liberties Protection Department, Legal Execution Department, Office of Justice Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.

The Ministry of Justice also oversees rehabilitation operations and management, which are handled through its Department of Corrections, Department of Probation, and Department of Juvenile Observation and Protection.

In the context of internal security, the Ministry of Justice also has specialized divisions, such as the Department of Special Investigation, Central Institute of Forensic Science, Office of the Narcotic Control Board, and Anti Money Laundering Office.

The Royal Thai Police

The Royal Thai Police (RTP) is led by a Commissioner General and subject to the office of the Prime Minister. In addition to preventing crime, upholding public safety, and enforcing the law, the RTP also provides protection to the Thai Royal Family, representatives, and guests. These functions are spread out over six groups with their own departments.

- The Special Operations group contains the Office of Royal Court Security Police.
Domestic Security Threats

Burmese Insurgency

Alt Armed groups within Burma have been waging a struggle against the military regime for years. Their fighting often spills into Thailand. Partly as a result of such violence, large numbers of refugees have fled into Thailand. The Burmese military frequently pursue the Shan State Army, a rebel group, into Thai territory, while the Karen National Union (KNU) and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), two armed Burmese groups, have also fought each other within the borders of Thailand.20

Burmese rebel groups have launched attacks on Thai targets as well. In January 2000, a Burmese Christian rebel group known as God’s Army crossed the border and captured a Thai hospital and then demanded medical attention for its wounded fighters.21 Insurgencies backed by the Burmese junta have raided refugee camps in Thailand and regular Burmese military units have also been sighted participating in such attacks.22 Such intrusions and the indiscriminate artillery fire by Burmese troops and rebels place the lives of Thai citizens and security forces in the border areas in grave danger.

The border conflict has also facilitated a surge in crime. Insufficient controls over the individuals and materials crossing the border have allowed illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking to go unchecked. The United Wa State Army, a Burmese ethnic faction, had smuggled vast quantities of methamphetamine into Thailand to fund its war with the military regime.23 It was estimated that total methamphetamine users in Thailand exceeded 1 million in 2011.24 The corresponding increase in gang crime, drug dealers, and addiction has inevitably stretched the resources of Thai law enforcement.

“Alt Armed groups within Burma have been waging a struggle against the military regime for years. Their fighting often spills into Thailand. Partly as a result of such violence, large numbers of refugees have fled into Thailand.”
Unscrupulous individuals and groups have exploited the plight of Burmese refugees. Human traffickers offer refugees safe passage at a price, often placing them in dangerous and deplorable conditions during the transportation process. Some traffickers fail to honor their agreements altogether, forcing their charges into involuntary servitude on arrival.25 Surprisingly, some members of the Thai security forces have also been responsible for perpetrating such incidents, in addition to collaborating with criminal groups. The Thai Navy had been caught apprehending displaced Rohingya Muslims and selling them to traffickers bound for Malaysia.26

Political Instability

The military coup that deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra in 2006 generated considerable civil unrest in the subsequent years. Citizens loyal to Thaksin formed the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship, also known as the “Red Shirts” for their namesake apparel. The Red Shirts demanded new elections and the resignation of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who came to power in 2008.

Through massive protests, the Red Shirts have demonstrated their enormous power to disrupt. The Red Shirts caused the cancellation of the April 2009 ASEAN summit after invading the venue in Pattaya. The day after, tens of thousands of protestors breached the interior ministry and formed encampments around the Government House, resulting in two deaths during the government’s response.27
However, royalist anti-Thaksin protestors have predated their Red Shirt counterparts. Known as the “Yellow Shirts,” the People’s Alliance for Democracy was present during the overthrow of the Thaksin government. Unlike the Red Shirts, the Yellow Shirts adhere to a more conservative ideology.

In August 2008, the Yellow Shirts assaulted the state broadcaster’s office, blocked roads and occupied the grounds of the Government House. In December of that year, the Yellow Shirts targeted Bangkok’s airports, halting the country’s tourism industry and stranding tens of thousands of travelers. Another group with ties to the Yellow Shirts, known as Pitak Siam, rallied in November 2012, prompting the government to deploy nearly 17,000 police officers and authorize the use of roadblocks and curfews.

Red Shirt protests in 2010 proved to be far more violent and destructive in their short-lived occupation of parts of Bangkok. As the Thai military attempted to disperse the protestors, widespread rioting, looting, and arson erupted. Rioters set up to 30 buildings on fire, including the country’s stock exchange, banks, a mall, and various government buildings. Though the protest leaders attempted to order their followers to stand down, they were unsuccessful. The Thai military responded with lethal force and set a curfew. About 100 protestors were killed and over 2,000 were wounded during the year. Thai soldiers in Bangkok killed an additional 22 and wounded 180 within two days in January 2011.

Muslim Separatists

A variety of separatist insurgent groups, mostly made up of Muslim Malays, have fought for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Southern Thailand since 2004. There are an estimated 3,000 to 9,000 separatist rebels at large. The Thai government has deployed at least 150,000 soldiers to the region. Aside from the goal of autonomy, the current Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand has been motivated by perceptions of inequality, lack of government representation, and excessive use of force and abuses committed by the Thai military.

The origins of the insurgency date back as far as 1909, when the Anglo-Siamese Treaty established the borders of Malaysia and Thailand. As a result of the treaty, much of the previously autonomous Muslim population in the Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces was forcefully incorporated into Thailand. The first insurgencies (circa 1970) initially had differing goals, grievances, and ideologies (ranging from Islamism, nationalism, to Communism). As a result, most of them were fragmented and uncoordinated, leading to their disappearance by the 1990’s. However, more extreme elements persisted and re-emerged in 2004. These rebels made use of small arms and improvised explosive devices in their attacks.
The conflict between the Thai government and Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand has exacted a steep toll. From 2004 to 2012, over 5,000 had been killed, including 631 soldiers and police officers and 280 suspected insurgents. The Thai government had spent the equivalent of $3.5 billion over the past decade, without any end in sight.36

Although an agreement to begin formal peace talks was signed by the Thai National Security Council and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) on February 28, 2013, violent incidents continued to flare up from time to time. Should the BRN cooperate and spearhead the peace process, it may still face considerable challenges. The Thai government may not be receptive to certain demands raised by the rebel groups.37 On the other hand, the BRN may have difficulty unifying all the insurgencies to participate in the peacemaking process – more extremist elements may continue the fight or splinter off from their parent factions.38

Protection of Critical Infrastructure

Airports

Airports in Thailand are regulated and managed by a public authority, known as Airports of Thailand (AOT). With respect to security, the AOT has the power to coordinate operations, manpower, and installation of infrastructure39. Officers under Thailand’s Immigration Bureau are responsible for processing passengers, identifying and intercepting persons of interest, while airport security guards and police patrols maintain public safety on airport grounds.40

Some airports have received dedicated police protection. In 2009, the Deputy Prime-Minister’s committee decided to establish a permanent police station at Suvarnabhumi airport, which would employ as many as 280 police officers. Previously the AOT had contracted with a private security company, the Loxley-ICTS Consortium, to provide security personnel and services at Suvarnabhumi.41

Gas and Oil Pipelines

To protect its developing infrastructure, the Thai government has dispatched hundreds of police officers to safeguard a pipeline project between Thailand and Malaysia.42 Thailand’s state-owned PTT also has a variety of technological controls to monitor the integrity of its pipelines, including fiber optics, satellite telecommunication, UHF and VHF radio, GPRS, and various telephone systems.43

The Burmese military oversaw the construction of the pipeline from the Yadana gas field to Thailand.44 At present, the Burmese military is still responsible for guarding sections of the Yadana pipeline within its borders.45 As of December 2011, Thailand imported as much as 30% of its natural gas from Burma.46
Critical Infrastructure

Airports

There are a total of 36 airports in Thailand. Six are operated by Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited and another 27 are operated by the Thai Department of Civil Aviation.47 The three busiest in 2011 were Suvernabhumi, Phuket, and Chiang Mai. Of them, the most active was Suvarnabhumi with 47,010,904 passengers over the year. Phuket followed with 8,467,995 passengers and Chiang Mai had 3,880,037. In total, the number of passengers traveling by air in Thailand increased from 58.2 million to 66.37 million from 2010 to 2011.48

At present, the only subway system in Thailand is the Bangkok Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) network. The Chaloem Ratchamongkhon Line (Blue Line) is the only operational line.49 The line consists of 18 stations over 22 km.50 Multiple extensions to the Bangkok MRT are in progress. These include a 27 km extension to the Blue Line consisting of two sections, as well as the creation of a 24 km Orange Line and 40 km Purple Line.

As of September 2012, the Bangkok Metro Company Limited has reported that over 250,000 passengers ride the MRT daily.51

Recent Terrorist Attacks

- May 1, 2013 – four militants opened fire with assault rifles in Pattani city. Six were killed, including a 2-year old child. The attackers escaped on motorcycles.52
- April 19, 2013 – four men on two motorcycles assassinate a policeman at gunpoint in the Yarang district of Pattani. Pol Maj Neramit Churoj was gathering intelligence on the insurgency until his death.53
- April 10, 2013 – a roadside bomb kills two soldiers and wounds six in the Panarae district in Pattani province.54
- September 21, 2012 – A car bomb killed at least six and wounded 40 in Sai Buri, Pattani province. The Global Terrorism Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace indicated that 173 terrorist attacks took place in Thailand in 2011.55
Thai Petroleum Pipeline Company (Thappline) oil pipelines

- Sriracha-Saraburi Route: transports oil from Sriracha to Lamlukka and Saraburi terminals, as well as the Donmuang Airport; 26 billion L annually (255 km)
- Suvarnabhumi Airport Route: carries oil from Lamlukka to Suvarnabhumi Airport; provides jet fuel to support 100 million airline passengers annually (38 km)
- Map Ta Phut-Sriracha Route: 7.2 billion L annually (67 km)

PTT gas pipelines

- Thailand has large offshore natural gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand.
- Trans Thailand-Malaysia Gas Pipeline: jointly built by Thailand’s PPT and Malaysia’s Petronas, this pipeline carries gas from the Gulf of Thailand to Songkhla and then to the border with Malaysia at Sadao.
- A network of pipelines connects various gas fields in the Gulf of Thailand; out of this network gas is transported west-northwest to Khanom (from Erawan) and north, along three pipelines to Rayong. The offshore pipeline network in the Gulf of Thailand is 2,013 km long.
- Eastern Pipeline: Onshore, pipelines move gas from Rayong west to coastal Chonburi and north to Bang Pakong at the northeast corner of the Bay of Bangkok. From Bang Pakong, pipelines distribute natural gas across central Thailand, including Bangkok as well as Ayutthaya and Saraburi provinces.

- March 31, 2012 – Multiple truck bombings in Yala killed 14 and wounded 500.56
- January 1, 2007 – Nine explosions killed three and injured 38 in Bangkok, during New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day. It was initially suspected that Thaksin supporters perpetrated the attack, but it was later determined that southern separatists were responsible.
- The Bangkok Post reports 114 “bomb-related incidents” in 2010 alone, as well as hundreds in prior years. Of the 114 cases in 2010, 71 resulted in detonation and there were 43 instances in which devices failed to explode.
from natural gas fields in the Andaman Sea east through southeastern Myanmar and into Kanchanaburi; from the border, a pipeline within Thailand carries this gas south to Ratchaburi, and another line runs from Ratchaburi into Wang Noi, central Thailand, where it connects to other pipelines.

- Pipelines in the northeast carry natural gas from fields in Phu Hom and Nam Phong to Khon Kaen
- Onshore natural gas pipelines have a combined length of 1,273 km (not including lines in Myanmar)

Summary

The cause of terrorism and political violence lies in Thailand’s domestic political polarization and inability to address long-standing ethnic grievances. Fortunately for Thailand, steps have been taken to achieve political reconciliation with disaffected groups. The country’s democratic process, however flawed and dysfunctional, offers a legitimate means for resolving such grievances. However, potential for escalation in terrorism is real in the event of a failed political settlement with the Muslim Malays in the south. Based on the record of political violence and its impact on Thai society, it is highly likely that terrorist attacks will aim at soft targets, particularly in Bangkok, in order to achieve maximum disruption and psychological and political effects. For the Thai government, investments in measures to strengthen the protection of these soft targets and develop effective contingency plans will be wise and necessary.
Endnotes

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35 http://www.bangkokairportonline.com/node/64
The Philippines at a glance

Total GDP (2011 - nominal): $224.8 billion
Per Capita GDP (2011): $2,370
Population: 105,720,644 (2013 estimate)
Urban Population as percentage of total population: 49%
Major Ethnic Groups: Tagalog (28.1%), Cebuano (13.1%), Ilocano (9.0%), Bisaya/Binisaya (7.6%), Hiligaynon Ilongo (7.5%)
Median Age of Population: 23.3 years
Number of Police per 100,000: 135.8
Defense Spending: $2.47 billion
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 1.1%

Combating Terrorism in the Philippines

The Philippines, a long-time ally of the United States, is an important asset in the United States’ strategy for maintaining a regional balance of power in Asia. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained two large and critical military bases in the country. Although the U.S. closed the Subic Bay and the Clark Air force Base two decades ago, it continues to keep a military presence in the Philippines and provide its security forces logistical support in the war on terror. The U.S. military and the Philippine military have held joint military exercises. Bilateral relations have recently improved significantly in the context of the U.S. “pivot” to Asia. The two nations are in the process of refining an agreement to increase the presence of U.S. military personnel and equipment in the country, according to the 3rd Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue. Consequently, the previously closed facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base may be reopened to accommodate the increase in United States military traffic in the Philippines. In accordance with the 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, however, it is unlikely that the bases will be leased back to the U.S.

Despite its contributions to counterterrorism and humanitarian operations, the increase in U.S. military assistance to the Philippines has sometimes been viewed as a discreet attempt to counter-balance the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increased military aid in the Philippines, allocating up to $30 million in 2012. Although an important ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, the security forces of the Philippines remain one of the worst-equipped in the region. Manila’s efforts to seek more aid from Washington have not always been successful. The U.S. grants some aid on a conditional basis and has withheld a portion of its Foreign Military Financing from the Philippines, citing the government’s lack of progress in its investigation and prosecution of past human rights violations committed by the Filipino military.

“Although an important ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, the security forces of the Philippines remain one of the worst-equipped in the region.”
The most immediate external threat to the country originates in the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines, Vietnam, and China all claim ownership over some islands in the South China Sea. In 2011, China and the Philippines were embroiled in a dangerous standoff over fishing rights near the Scarborough Shoal (known to the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc). As a result, the president of the Philippines has called for an increase in security in the Shoal. The Philippines has recently announced its intention to bring its grievances to a United Nations arbitration panel to settle its disputes with China, although Beijing will unlikely abide by the decisions rendered by this panel.

Aside from the tensions occurring in the South China Sea, the Philippine government has been drawn into a standoff over Malaysia’s Sabah state. In February 2013, an armed group known as the Royal Army of Sulu, entered Sabah in an attempt to reclaim it. The group hails from the southwestern Philippines and is loyal to Sultan Jamalul Kiram III. Sabah had originally been part of the Sultanate of Sulu and leased to a British company in 1878. However, Sabah was forcefully annexed by the British government and incorporated into a newly independent Malaysia in 1963. Though the descendants of the Sultanate received an annual payment (approximately $1700) from the Malaysian government, the Kiram family claims that the sum is unreasonably insufficient and wishes to regain the land.

The incursion has resulted in fighting with Malaysian security forces, with deaths occurring on both sides. As non-state actors, the perpetrators have proven difficult for the Philippine government to rein in and negotiate with. The Royal Army of Sulu has also received reinforcements from the Moro National Liberation Front, further escalating the ongoing conflict.
Domestic Security and Terrorist Threats

A variety of terrorist groups operate in the Philippines. There are al-Qaeda affiliated factions like Abu Sayyaf and insurgencies borne out of ethnic and religious conflict. Communist rebels also operate within the Philippines. Private armies employed by politicians also perpetrate violence against rivals.

Communist Insurgency

The New People’s Army is the militant branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Formed in 1969, the NPA drew popular support from the impoverished and working class. Today, the NPA continues to carry out its activities. The Philippine government’s attempts at making peace with the group have been fruitless. The NPA is funded through contributions and extortion from businesses; it often seizes weapons from the police and military.

As of 2010, the NPA had, based on estimates, at most 5,000 fighters with access to firearms. The NPA has also spawned various offshoot factions, such as the Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB). However, the NPA also has enemies outside the government, such as the Rebolusyonong Hukbong Bayan (RHB), another communist insurgent group that had split from the CPP. The NPA is currently at war with ABB and RHB. The NPA and its rivals have targeted each other’s members and competed over territory. However, of the contending factions, the NPA remains the strongest.

Mindanao and the Moro Separatists: Ethnic Conflict in Mindanao

Mindanao was home to the Moro people, the Muslim minority living in the Southern Philippines. They fiercely resisted the Spanish occupation since the 16th century. After the American annexation of the Philippines, Manila sponsored migration into Mindanao, fueling the Moro’s antagonism to the government. Religious rivalries, political alienation, economic and social inequalities have been responsible for the long-standing unrest in Mindanao.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the main armed group in the region, has reached peace with the Philippine government. After the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989 and another peace agreement in 1996, the MNLF has ceased its armed struggle against the government (although approximately 3,000 MNLF fighters were allowed to remain armed). However, other armed factions remain active. As of 2012, the Mindanao conflict is estimated to have claimed the lives of 120,000 people and displaced two million.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a splinter group of the MNLF formed in 1978. Though peace agreements and dialogues with the MILF have come and gone, efforts to disarm MILF have yet to bear fruit. Though the MILF and the Philippine government formed a joint effort to drive out Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah in 2004, the two are still at odds with each other. Despite a current ceasefire agreement, clashes still erupt periodically between the MILF and the Philippine government. The MILF is also suspected of being responsible for terrorist attacks in recent years.
While obtaining the cooperation of other smaller Muslim militant groups may have complicated the peace process, uncompromising views in the government have also hindered efforts of negotiating a peaceful resolution.\(^{25}\) Under Gloria Arroyo’s presidency, Christian politicians and hardliner military officials rejected a 2007 memorandum of understanding that would have established an autonomous government in Mindanao, known as the Bangsamoro Judicial Entity.\(^{26}\) As a result, violence resumed. Years later, President Aquino’s meeting with MILF leadership in 2011 also failed to produce results. The MILF rejected the government’s offer, which was unsatisfactory compared to the terms negotiated by President Arroyo’s administration in 2007.

Another major group in the Mindanao conflict is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was formed in 1991. Like the MILF, the ASG was also launched by radicals who broke away from the MNLF.\(^{27}\) The ASG seeks the creation of an independent Muslim state throughout the Pacific. To accomplish its goals, the ASG employs bombings, raids, and assassinations. Opposition to the peace process in Mindanao has also drawn more extremist elements under the MNLF and MILF to the ASG’s cause.

The ASG is heavily involved in organized crime. The group relies on kidnappings and extortion to finance its operations, in addition to receiving contributions from supporters. The group recently released an Australian man, though other foreign nationals remain in its custody.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, ASG also has ties to al-Qaeda. ASG members have received training from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, as well as support from al-Qaeda affiliates based in the Philippines. The ASG is known to have harbored other terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah.

In April 2013, the Philippine military mounted an operation that killed several ASG members and wounded the ASG leader, Isnilon Hapilon. However, Mr. Hapilon remains at large.\(^{29}\)

## Militias and Private Armies

Aside from Communist rebels and terrorists, security in the Philippines is being threatened by the existence and operation of private armies and militias. In November 2009, fighters loyal to the Ampatuan clan ambushed a convoy consisting of family members and supporters of a rival politician, Esmael Mangudadatu. Fifty-seven were killed in the ensuing massacre, though Andal Ampatuan Jr. was later charged with murder.\(^{30}\) At the time of the attack, Ampatuan and his men were alleged to have coerced the local police into standing down, allowing them to carry out the massacre unhindered.\(^{31}\)

As a result, the existence of such armed groups allows political corruption to flourish through violence and intimidation. Politicians with mutual ties to armed groups can effectively rig elections and silence opponents at the local and national levels. However, in 2010, the Philippine government established an independent commission and tried to disband private armies. Though the commission was granted authority to define what constitutes a private army, it lacked the actual enforcement capability to disarm these groups—a power exclusive to the police. Consequently, critics have stated that the commission will only be marginally successful in carrying out its mission.\(^{32}\)
The Philippine Department of Justice has a variety of responsibilities and departments. Its main agencies in charge of internal security are its Bureau of Immigration, National Bureau of Investigation, Parole and Probation Administration, and Bureau of Corrections.

The Bureau of Immigration is tasked with border control, as well as documentation and monitoring of foreign nationals. The bureau has the power to issue visas and permits and conduct deportation and repatriation procedures. In addition to aiding law enforcement in immigration-related matters, the Bureau of Immigration also has the power to investigate, arrest, and detain foreigners suspected of violating the law.

The National Bureau of Investigation is responsible for forensic services, research, and criminal investigation. The Parole and Probation Administration and Bureau of Corrections handle parolee supervision and prison operations respectively.

The other agencies are in charge of administrative and judicial functions. These include the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Public Attorney’s Office, Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Office of the Solicitor General, and Land Registration Authority.

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**Philippine National Police**

The Directorial Staff consist of the following directorates. Each directorate is responsible for establishing policies and procedures for its respective division.

- Personnel and Records Management
- Intelligence
- Operations
- Integrated Police Operations
- Logistics
- Plans
- Comptrollership
- Police-Community Relations
- Investigation and Detective Management
- Human Resource and Doctrines Development
- Research and Development
- Information and Communications Tech Management
The Administrative Support Units consist of the following services

- Logistics Support
- Information Technology Management
- Finance
- Health
- Communications and Electronic
- Personnel and Retirement Benefits
- Chaplain
- Legal
- Headquarters Support
- Engineering
- Training

The Operational Support Units consist of the following groups

- Maritime
- Intelligence
- Police Security and Protection
- Criminal Investigation and Detection
- Special Action Force
- Anti Cybercrime
- Aviation Security
- Highway Patrol
- Police-Community Relations
- Civil Security
- Crime Laboratory
- Anti Kidnapping

Philippine National Police

The top leadership of the Philippine National Police (PNP) consists of the Chief of the PNP, Chief of the Directorial Staff, and two Deputy Chiefs for Administration and Operations. The offices of Human Rights Affairs, Program Management, and the Internal Affairs Service are also under the Chief of the PNP.

The PNP is divided into three main wings: the Directorial Staff, Administrative Support Units; Operational Support Units, and the National Capital Regional Police Office and other Police Regional Offices. The National Capital Regional Police Office has a regional public safety management battalion and five District Offices with their respective Police Stations and Sub-stations.

The other Regional Police Offices also have regional public safety management battalions, though they are divided into provincial and city police offices, rather than districts. There are over 12 regional offices, in addition to offices in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cordillera Administrative Region, Calabarzon, and Mimaropa. Each City Police Office is in charge of an array of police stations and a city public safety management company. Provincial Police Offices control various municipal police stations.
Airport Security

There are 85 national airports in the Philippines. Of them, 10 serve international flights, 35 are domestic (with 16 designated as Class 1 and 19 as Class 2), and 40 are community airports used for general aviation. The Civil Aviation Security Bureau (under the Office for Transportation Security) is responsible for establishing air travel security regulations. The CASB is also responsible for conducting audits and inspections of security procedures at airports.

The three busiest airports in the Philippines are Ninoy Aquino, Mactan-Cebu, and Francisco Bangoy (Davao). Ninoy Aquino was the most active in 2010, with 20,281,231 passengers. Mactan-Cebu followed with 5,791,387 passengers and Davao with 2,229,177. Altogether, air passengers in the Philippines increased from 47,367,824 in 2010 to 52,075,941 in 2011.

Airports in the Philippines are protected by the Aviation Security Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP-AVSEGROUP). The Group’s mission includes screening passengers and luggage, preventing crime, and safeguarding important individuals and politicians. The PNP-AVSEGROUP is also in charge of supervising private and government security officers on duty and coordinating inspections and audits with the CASB and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines.

Divisions of the PNP-AVSEGROUP include Administrative and Human Resources Management, Intelligence Investigation and Counterterrorism, Operations Management, Logistics and Technical Management, and Quality Assurance and Doctrine Development. The four main units are the Special Operations Units, Canine Units, Mobile Patrol Security Unit, and Aviation Security Unit. These units are responsible for explosive ordnance disposal, bomb detection, and hijacking prevention. As of 2008, at least 1500 AVSEGROUP personnel were deployed to 65 airports throughout the nation.

Recent major terrorist attacks in the Philippines

- October 3, 2011: The NPA launched a massive assault against three mines in the Surigao del Norte Province. Three security guards were killed and four hostages taken. The rebels inflicted major property damage and stole firearms from the companies’ guards. Roughly 300 rebels participated in the operation. The attack is believed to have occurred after the Taganito Mining Corporation, Taganito HPAL Nickel Corporation, and Platinum Group Metals Corporation refused to give in to NPA extortion demands.

- April 25, 2012: NPA fighters ambushed an AFP convoy in Ifugao Province. 10 soldiers were killed.

- July 11, 2012: ASG militants attacked a truck carrying workers in Sumisip. Six rubber plantation workers were killed and an additional 27 wounded when the Tumahubong Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Integrated Development Cooperative was unable to pay extortion fees to the ASG.
Mass Transit Systems

Rapid rail transit systems in the Philippines are primarily located in Manila. They consist of Light Rail Transit lines 1 and 2 (LRT) as well as Mass Rapid Transit - Line 3 (MRT line 3). LRT Line 1 covers 20 stations over a 15 km route. Line 2 covers 11 stations over a 13.8 km route. In 2012, 170.72 million passengers rode on Line 1 and 70.33 million passengers used Line 2. The MRT Line 3 is 16.9 km long and consists of 13 stations. As of 2013, the MRT carries about 600,000 passengers on a daily basis, despite a load limit of 350,000. At present the government is looking to decongest MRT passenger traffic through the purchase of additional train cars.

- July 27, 2012: An AFP raid on an Abu Sayyaf encampment and a subsequent rebel ambush resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers and four militants.
- January 17, 2013: A rogue element of the MILF attacked a village where MNLF members resided. Two MNLF members were wounded. The perpetrators attacked with guns and grenades.
- February 19, 2013: The NPA attacked a Del Monte compound in Budkinon. Four were killed, including a security guard. The attackers stole guns from the compound’s armory and caused at least $600,000 in damage. At least 50 rebels were involved in the raid, while an additional 30 damaged a Dole-Stanfico facility in Impasugong town. Another group of NPA fighters held up policemen in Sumilao and confiscated their weapons.
Pipeline Security

In anticipation of potential attacks on Philippine oil facilities, the United States and Philippines have participated in a joint planning effort. The two nations will engage in exercises and training events with various other nations, covering scenarios such as piracy or terrorism.

In 2011, the Philippine Congress declared that oil and gas pipelines were a national security concern. As a result, the National Pipeline Board (NPB) was created through House Bill 5477. HB 5477 also introduced new regulations covering the licensing, inspection, and monitoring of pipeline projects, as well as assigning various security responsibilities to Philippine government agencies.

According to HB 5477, the Department of National Defense was in charge of developing security plans through the AFP, in addition to conducting site security inspections of pipelines. The Department of Interior Labor and Government was tasked with obtaining PNP manpower to secure, as well as obtaining local government cooperation and Bureau of Fire Protection assistance in fire control.

The Philippines has two major oil and gas pipelines: (1) Central Luzon Oil Pipeline carries crude and refined oil from Batangas to Manila over a length of 117 km; (2) Malampaya Submarine Pipeline transports natural gas from the Malampaya gas field to Batangas over 504 km.

Summary

The most important internal security challenges in the Philippines concern those dealing with armed religious and separatist groups. The Filipino government has pursued a two-pronged strategy: combining military operations with political negotiations. This strategy so far has yielded mixed results. In terms of investment in its organizational and technological capabilities, the Filipino government needs to make more resources available and implement reforms to streamline its national security bureaucracy and dedicate specialized agencies to the management of internal terrorist threats. The good news for the Philippines is that terrorist attacks have remained localized. But the risks that such attacks can be perpetrated in more densely and politically sensitive areas, should political negotiations fail, are real and significant.
Endnotes

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Indonesia at a glance

Total GDP (2011 - nominal): $846.8 billion
Per Capita GDP (2011): $3,495\(^1\)
Urban Population as percentage of total population: 44%
Major Ethnic Groups: Javanese (40.6%), Sundanese (15.0%), Madurese (3.3%), Minangkabau (2.7%), Betawi (2.4%), Bugis (2.4%)
Median Age of Population: 28.9 years\(^2\)
Number of Police per 100,000: 127.4\(^3\)
Defense Spending: $7.01 billion\(^4\)
Defense Spending as a percentage of GDP: 0.7%\(^5\)

Indonesia’s Security Environment

As the country with the largest Muslim population in the world and a fast-growing developing nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is strategically and economically important. It has abundant natural resources, a huge labor force, and guards the Malacca Strait, the vital shipping lane for East Asia. Since its democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia has weathered many difficult challenges, such as the secession of East Timor, ethnic conflict, economic recovery, and terrorism. But the new democratic government has demonstrated its resilience in meeting these challenges. Among Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia faces security threats from Muslim extremism, ethnic conflict and separatism. However, by and large, the Indonesian state seems to be capable of dealing with these threats effectively on its own. It has allowed East Timor to become independent, ending a long-standing conflict. The ethnic conflict in Aceh is under control. Terrorist attacks in recent years have caused substantial losses of human lives and property, but the Indonesian security forces have countered such attacks with effective measures and captured a large number of perpetrators.

On the national security front, Indonesia continues to modernize and expand its military, as do most other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. However, unlike other powers that are strengthening their militaries in an attempt to respond to China’s growing military power, Indonesia appears to have a focus on cooperation with China, instead of overt confrontation. For example, the country is involved in a joint effort to develop naval missile defense systems with China. But Indonesia is also hedging its bets. It continues to foster longstanding ties with the United States.

For decades, Indonesia has received U.S. equipment and funding. In the East Timor controversy, a significant amount of the equipment used by Indonesian forces in the occupation and invasion was of US origin.\(^6\) Though Indonesia initially faced a 1991 U.S. arms embargo for its atrocities in East Timor, it was lifted in 2005. In addition, it has regained eligibility for the US International Military Education and Training Program.\(^8\) The United States has recently intensified its efforts to strengthen ties with Indonesia. For example, it has offered to sell additional F-16 aircraft to Indonesia’s airforce. The United States has also donated high-speed patrol boats to Indonesia’s maritime police operations under the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).\(^9\)
Though some experts state that Indonesia is more closely affiliated with the United States than China, China’s investment and partnership with Indonesia still remain considerable. Trade between the two nations has notably increased since 2005. In addition, a 2005 strategic partnership has brought forth military exchanges, including Indonesian military officers training in China and joint efforts to produce weapons and equipment. Some scholars have also noted that Indonesia may not be amenable to what may be seen as excessive advances to pressure the nation into siding with the United States.\textsuperscript{10}

As identified by past politicians and scholars, some of Indonesia’s most significant threats are not necessarily posed by other nations, but by internal conflict.\textsuperscript{11} Various minority groups hold grievances against the national government, originating from their forced incorporation after the end of the Second World War. As a result, extremist separatist groups have carried out attacks against the government and the military in an attempt to secure their independence from Indonesia. Meanwhile, disputes between religious groups continue to materialize, resulting in sporadic violence. Regardless of the government’s professed support religious tolerance, animosity lingers among the population, while law enforcement agencies have been unable to prevent or intervene in confrontations between religious groups from time to time.

Indonesia has unresolved territorial disputes with Malaysia.\textsuperscript{12} Both countries have accused each other of trespassing and violating each other’s sovereignty through unauthorized incursions with civilian and military vessels in locations such as the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and the Sulawesi Sea. In 2002, Indonesia lost the Sipadan and Ligitan islands after an international tribunal ruled in Malaysia’s favor.\textsuperscript{13} But the two countries continue to be embroiled in the disputes over the resource rich Ambalat Block.\textsuperscript{14}

Indonesia has also had disputes with Singapore over maritime borders; they settled a dispute in 2009 concerning the maritime border around the Indonesian island of Nipah.

In the near future, Indonesia’s national security environment will remain relatively benign. Despite maritime disputes in the South China Sea, which involve mainly China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, it is unlikely that Indonesia would be dragged into any conflict resulting from these disputes.

“...some of Indonesia’s most significant threats are not necessarily posed by other nations, but by internal conflict.”
Domestic Security and Terrorist Threats

With the end of President Suharto’s reign in 1998, Indonesia found itself facing difficult challenges on numerous fronts. Unrest and violence spread throughout the country as separatist movements began to contest the authority of the new democratic government. However, such unrest soon subsided. The new government took several steps to restore stability. It instituted political decentralization, allowing regional and local government offices to be elected competitively. This reform seemed to have met the demands for local autonomy from previously aggrieved groups. However, decentralization also has its dark side. Local corruption and abuse of power has grown worse, potentially complicating efforts of maintaining security and stability in areas affected by terrorist activities. 

The Indonesian National Police budgeted a total 29.8 trillion IDR ($3 billion) for domestic security in 2011. It also receives financial assistance from various other nations in developing counterterrorism and security programs. Efforts to combat terrorism involve deployment of police forces to troubled zones, as well as operations targeting known and suspected terrorists. The Indonesian Army (TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia) is also deployed on peacekeeping missions in areas of unrest.

Compared with terrorist incidents around the world, a greater proportion of terrorist attacks in Indonesia are executed as sophisticated and coordinated efforts. Such attacks have historically targeted civilians, government personnel and property, as well as infrastructure. While the majority of fatalities and acts of violence in Indonesia occurred over a decade ago, incidents such as bombings and armed attacks continue to happen on a periodic basis.

In spite of government efforts to quell conflicts, confrontations between religious groups continue to surface and result in property damage and human casualties. Muslims, Christians, and various ethnic groups are embroiled in disputes and conflicts in several regions. Some have banded to form extremist organizations intent on obtaining independence from Indonesia, while others have armed themselves for the purposes of self-defense or preemptive attacks. Other groups with separatist motives have launched attacks in an attempt to force the government into granting them sovereignty. Islamic extremists with links to Al Qaeda and other terror networks also remain at large in Indonesia. The following is a list of groups involved in terrorist attacks in Indonesia in recent years and regions with high levels of ethnic and religious tensions:

**Islamic Separatists**

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was active in seeking the creation of an autonomous Islamic kingdom in Aceh, a northern province in Sumatra that had historically remained independent throughout Dutch colonization. After being forcefully incorporated into Indonesia following the Dutch withdrawal, the lack of reforms and instances of military brutality provided the motivation for terrorist attacks, which targeted civilians, Indonesian military, and Exxon-Mobil facilities in the area. GAM was one of the most active extremist groups in Indonesia, having carried out as many as 58 attacks in a single year during its heydays. The U.S. offered Indonesia aid in the war on terror, but it also pressured the Indonesian government to obtain a peaceful solution in Aceh. A turning point in the conflict in Aceh came in 2004, when a disastrous tsunami inflicted heavy damage and undermined the morale of the belligerents in Aceh. As of 2005, the Free Aceh Movement has been disbanded and peaceful elections have taken place. Non-local TNI soldiers have since been removed from the region.
Islamic Extremists

Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a group with ties to Al-Qaeda, was responsible for one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the country, the 2002 bombing that killed 202 in Bali. JI also has a splinter group operating in Sulawesi, known as Mujahideen KOMPAK. Other forms of Islamic extremism exist, including the Front for Defenders of Islam, a vigilante group that attempts to enforce Sharia law by employing violence and vandalism against what it deems to be immoral activity, such as prostitution or recreational drug use.

Maluku and Sulawesi – Christian and Muslim sectarian violence and separatism

The Maluku (Moluccan) Islands are a key location for Christian-Muslim violence. The earliest attempts at Maluku separatist movements could be traced to 1950. However, the roots of the conflict go back to Dutch colonialism. Revived in 1998, the self-claimed South Maluku Republic (RMS) rose in an attempt to secure an independent Christian state. Muslim groups like Laskar Jihad (LJ) have also banded for the purposes of waging war with the Maluku Christian population. While such groups have engaged in acts of terror against the Indonesian government, much of the sectarian violence occurs independently of terrorist motivations and objectives.

Central Sulawesi remains a Muslim and Christian battleground. Like Maluku, Christianity was introduced into the region by the Dutch, who also bestowed favor upon their converts. The onset of immigration and the increase in diversity in Sulawesi eventually generated ethnic tensions, to the point where sites of worship were attacked and citizens murdered by rival parties. Despite police intervention and government attempts to broker peace, hostilities continue in these areas, resulting in death and property damage as recent as August 2012 – 10 years after the signing of the Malino II Accord (an agreement among warring parties to end violence). Corruption has undermined the effects of aid in the region, with many government programs failing to address socioeconomic welfare issues in favor of pursuing security and law enforcement measures.

Ethnic Conflict

In addition to religious tensions and extremism, ethnic conflict is also responsible for a substantial share of Indonesia’s unrest and violence.

In the case of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, there is a long history of discrimination that started with Dutch colonial practices and persisted in the newly independent Indonesia. Prior to the democratic transition in 1998, the Chinese-Indonesians had been banned from using their language or
expressing their culture. While such government-sanctioned oppression against ethnic Chinese minority ended with Suharto’s reign, hate-related incidents still occur.28 Some of the hostile sentiments towards the Chinese can be attributed to negative perceptions of their wealth and exploitation of Indonesian workers. The Chinese remain a small, albeit economically influential, minority – less than 3 percent of Indonesia’s total population is ethnically Chinese.29 At present, improved human rights under Indonesia’s new democracy have given ethnic Chinese-Indonesians greater protection of civil liberties. But given the bloody history of race riots targeting ethnic Chinese, the risks of such incidents in the future cannot be ruled out.

Another hotspot of ethnic conflict in Indonesia is West Papua (called West Irian Jaya prior to 2007). The Free Papua Movement and various unaffiliated extremists in the region have been waging armed struggle against Jakarta. West Papua was originally occupied by the Dutch, who had been preparing it for independence. But after the Dutch withdrawal, Indonesian forces moved into Papua. At that time, Western nations did not oppose the incursion, out of fear that Papua would join the communist bloc if allowed to pursue its sovereignty.30

Furthermore, government-backed transmigration programs brought many non-native Indonesians to various islands in the archipelago, including West Papua. Some West Papuans saw this movement as an invasion and threat to their indigenous culture. Inequality between indigenous Papuans and non-native residents has fueled discontent, spurred by discrimination and a lack of economic prospects. In response, West Papuan resistance groups like the Free Papua Movement (OPM) formed and conducted attacks on government personnel, property, and foreigners in an effort to claim independence and drive out non-natives.31 Violence continues to erupt in West Papua, with some incidents believed to be the work of the OPM. Perpetrators in other cases have yet to be identified.

Reported Major Terrorist Incidents in Recent Years

• May 16, 2005, an unidentified group of six attacked a police post in Loki, killing six people, of which five were paramilitary officers. One perpetrator was killed in the attack; no group has claimed responsibility.

• May 28, 2005, a marketplace and police station were bombed in Tentena, Sulawesi. Twenty-two were killed and 60 injured. While the attack is believed to be the work of Jemaah Islamiya, none claimed responsibility.

• October 1, 2005, bombings at Jimbaran beach and a restaurant in Kuta caused the deaths of 25 in Bali, in addition to 100 injuries. No group claimed responsibility for the attacks, though Jemaah Islamiya is suspected of carrying them out.
Organization of Internal Security

Until the end of Suharto’s rule, the Indonesian military exercised unchallenged influence in politics and domestic security affairs. After the transition to democracy, Indonesia’s National Police (POLRI) was separated from the military in 1999, though it still remains subordinate to the office of the Defense Minister. Prior to the separation, the police shared much of their rank structure and responsibilities with the armed forces. However, there is continuity even after the formal separation. The Indonesian military and the POLRI coordinate their operations closely and share some security responsibilities. According to Indonesia’s Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Police Force, the mission of the POLRI is to maintain public security and order, enforce the law, protect and serve the community. The Kapolri is the title of the chief of the National Police. The Kapolri is appointed and dismissed by the president as approved by the House of People’s Representatives.

At the top of the territorial command structure is the national police headquarters, “mabes polri.” Subordinate to the headquarters are 17 regional police jurisdictions, known as the polda. Beneath the polda are the polwiltabes and polwil, which are municipal-level divisions. The district tier consists of the poltabes, polresta, and polres, which are the city, metropolitan, and district police respectively. Districts are also divided into subdistricts, which have their own polsek, or subdistrict police. Beneath the subdistricts are individual police posts (wards) and babinkamtibmas, or officers for social order in village subunits.
The administrative tier of the POLRI encompasses the office of the General Inspectorate and various assistant offices in charge of operations, planning and budgeting, human resources, and logistics. Other key branches include profession and security, law, public relations, information technology and the international relations division – which also houses INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau for Indonesia. The POLRI’s supporting elements consist of the Research and Development, Financial, Health and Medical, and History Centers, as well as a Police Education Institution composed of the Staff and Command School, Police Science College, and Police Academy.37

The POLRI’s main executive elements are Security and Intelligence, Security Maintenance, Criminal Investigation, Traffic Corps, Mobile Brigade, and Densus 88. The Mobile Brigade is an elite force that specializes in emergency operations and riot control.38 Densus 88 (Detachment 88) is Indonesia’s main special counter-terrorist unit. Established after the 2002 Bali bombings, Densus 88 has received US funding, training and support through the 2003 State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. Densus 88 has also obtained additional funding and training from the Australian government.39

Airport Security

PT Angkasa Pura is a two-part state enterprise under the Ministry of Transportation. It is responsible for managing airports and providing services such as landing, hangar, passenger, cargo, safety and emergency response operations. PT Angkasa Pura I is in charge of 13 airports in Central and Eastern Indonesia. PT Angkasa Pura II oversees 12 airports in Western Indonesia.40

Both the Indonesian police and military elements also have roles in airport security. At Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin Airport, the Palembang police and Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) share security responsibilities and operations.41 The state airport operators are responsible for setting up surveillance cameras and posts.42

The busiest airport in Indonesia is currently Soekarno-Hatta in Jakarta. Soekarno-Hatta served 53,677,752 passengers in 2012 and 47,647,377 in 2011.43 Juanda International in Surabaya is the second most active airport, with 16 million annual passengers as of 2012.44 Ngurah Rai stands as the third most active airport, having served 12,771,874 passengers in 2011.45 Between 2011 and 2012, Indonesia experienced gains of 6.01% and 12.81% in domestic and international air passenger traffic respectively.46

Subways

Indonesia does not currently have any operational subway systems, though the Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit project is a work in progress. The Jakarta network will span approximately 110.8 km over two main routes, the North-South and East-West corridors.47 Initial efforts to launch the Jakarta rail transit project had been delayed for over two decades and a previous attempt to construct a public monorail foundered in 2005 due to funding difficulties.48 PT MRT Jakarta has announced its intentions to begin construction in July 2013.49
Energy Industry Infrastructure

The Indonesian archipelago has abundant natural resources. However, given the nation’s political turmoil in various regions, its energy infrastructure has been targets of terrorist attacks. In Aceh, GAM had carried out attacks against Exxon-Mobil facilities. Other regions may also be prone to violence resulting from local resentment of foreign resource exploitation and economic inequality. At present, PT Pertamina is Indonesia’s state-owned energy company. Perusahaan Gas Negara is a state-owned utility responsible for transmissions.

Security of energy infrastructure falls upon both the private sector and the police. In West Papua, joint security measures were adopted by the police and BP’s own security for safeguarding key facilities of the Tangguh LNG Project.50

In the instance of other natural resource companies, Freeport-McMoRan hired Indonesian police and military units to guard their mining operations, though concerns over their ineffectiveness have led Freeport to devote additional security expenditures to engage private military companies like Triple Canopy, an American security firm founded by U.S. Army special force veterans.51

Major natural gas facilities

Bontang LNG – The Bontang LNG Plant is a liquefaction plant operated by PT Badak, located in East Kalimantan. The plant’s capacity allows it to produce up to 22.5 million tons of LNG and one million tons of LPG annually. The facility can store up to 636,000 tons of LNG across its six LNG storage tanks and 200,000 tons of LPG in its five LPG storage tanks.52

Arun LNG – The Arun LNG Plant is a converted regasification plant operated by PT Pertamina in Blang Lancang, situated along the northern coast of Sumatra.53 Formerly a liquefaction plant, Arun entered its engineering, procurement, and construction phase in April 2013.54 As a liquefaction plant, Arun was capable of producing 12.5 millions tons of LNG annually in 2008.55 The plant’s five storage tanks can contain up to 127,200 cubic meters of gas.56

Tangguh LNG – the Tangguh LNG Plant is a liquefaction plant operated by BP Indonesia in Bintuni Bay. Annual production capacity of Tangguh totaled 7.6 million tons in 2011.57 However, an expansion project approved by the Indonesian government in November 2012 will increase total production capacity to 11.4 million tons.58

Nusantara Regas – Nusantara Regas is a floating storage regasification terminal located off the northern coast of West Java and operated by PT Nusantara Regas, a joint venture between Pertamina and Perusahaan Gas Negara. The facility can process three million tons of LNG annually, yielding 400 million cubic feet of gas daily.59 The gas storage capacity of Nusantara Regas is 125,000 cubic meters, though the planned addition of another floating storage regasification unit may add up to 170,000 cubic meters.60

“...given the nation’s political turmoil in various regions, its energy infrastructure has been targets of terrorist attacks.”
Lampung FSRU – Lampung is a floating storage regasification unit that is still under construction. After completion, the unit will be located in Lampung province in southern Sumatra. Perusahaan Gas Negara plans to commence its operations in 2014. Lampung will be capable of processing two million tons of LNG yearly and storing up to 170,000 cubic meters.

Donggi-Senoro LNG – The Donggi-Senoro LNG Plant is located in Central Sulawesi. Mitsubishi Corporation is the largest stakeholder and the operator of the plant, though PT Donggi-Senoro LNG will act as a co-operator. The plant will initiate operations in 2014, yielding up to two million tons of LNG annually.

**Major oil and gas pipelines operated by PT Pertamina**

- Tempino – Plaju pipeline, 267 km, connects the oil storage tanks in Tempino, Jambi, to the Plaju refinery in South Sumatra. The pipeline has been plagued by theft through siphoning.
- Simenggaris – Bunyu natural gas pipeline: it extends 70 km, connecting Mandul Island and Bunyu Island.
- Simpang Y – Pusri natural gas pipeline (36.65 km) links Layang Island to South Sumatra.

**Pipelines operated by Perusahaan Gas Negara**

- South Sumatra – West Java pipeline is 500 km long and delivers natural gas from fields in South Sumatra to distribution networks in Muara Bekasi and Rawa Maju.
- Grissik – Duri pipeline spans 536 km and connects the ConocoPhilips facility at Grissik with Chevron Pacific Indonesia’s receiving facility in Duri.
Summary

Terrorism poses a far more deadly threat to Indonesia’s domestic security than in other Southeast Asian countries. The Indonesian government has made much progress in confronting this threat, but must devote more resources to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities. In particular, more investments in manpower, equipment, and training will be required. The protection of soft targets in its key economic sectors, tourism and energy, will continue to be a difficult task in the foreseeable future.
Endnotes

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   (Derived using 2013 population estimated)
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