

COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA

A Case Study of California's
Redistricting in the 1990s

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Preface

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The contents, and any errors therein, are the sole responsibility of the author.

Introduction

California's current debate on redistricting reform encompasses many issues. On one point, even pro-reform advocates differ: does a reform proposal need to require the creation of competitive districts?

Those who favor a redistricting process free of partisan data such as voter registration or election history information oppose such a proposal, arguing that the use of any data on partisanship implicitly taints the process. These reform advocates endorse redistricting criteria that require compact districts and the unification of cities, counties, and other communities of interest, along with a ban on the use of incumbent home addresses.

Other reformers endorse those same criteria, with one addition: a requirement (in some form) for maximizing competitiveness.

The following analysis is based on the Rose Institute's review of the 1990s redistricting in California, in which Assembly, State Senate, and Congressional district lines were drawn by a panel of Special Masters and the State Supreme Court. This case study is not a definitive answer to the need for a competitiveness criterion, just one look at what happened when such a criterion was not included.

California's Special Masters

In 1991, Republican Governor Pete Wilson deadlocked with the majority-Democrat State Senate and Assembly. On September 23rd of that year, the Governor vetoed the legislature's redistricting plans, an attempted veto override failed, and the

legislature adjourned for the rest of the year. On September 26th, the California Supreme Court appointed Special Masters to draw the district lines.ⁱ On November 29th the Masters submitted their proposal to the Court, and, with only minor adjustments, the Court adopted the plans for use in the elections of 1992. The plans remained in place for all elections through 2000.

According to their report, the Masters used the following criteria, which they drew from the Federal Law; Article XXI, Section I of the California Constitution; and the California Supreme Court's decision in *Legislature v. Reinecke* (1973)].ⁱⁱ

- The Federal Voting Rights Act, including a desire to avoid dilution of potential "Minority Influence" areas or districts
- Population Equality within 1 percent of the ideal population
- Contiguity
- Geographical Integrity
- County and City Integrity
- Integrity of California's Basic Geographic Regions
- Communities of Interest, defined as "The social and economic interests common to the population of an area which are probable subjects of legislative action."
- "Nesting": the practice of combining two Assembly Districts to create each State Senate District.ⁱⁱⁱ

Note that "competitiveness" is not a criterion. The Masters addressed this question directly:

"Briefs presented to us have raised the issue of "political fairness," i.e., the drawing of district lines so as not to advantage one political party or the

other. While it has been understood and accepted that we would not employ partisan data in the drawing of district lines, it has been suggested that after drawing district boundaries we should apply a political test reviewing the proposed districts in terms of their current partisan registration or a previous statewide election.

"We have not done so, for three reasons. First, we note that our instructions from the Supreme Court make no reference to evaluating districts in terms of partisan political criteria, such as determining the "safeness" or "competitiveness" of a particular district. . . .

"Second, even if we had wished to do so, time constraints under which we have been required to operate would have precluded the development of a political litmus test in which we would have confidence. The days of analysis required to conduct such a test and to make adjustments would have made it impossible to meet an already difficult deadline.

"Finally, the various "fairness" tests suggested to us, which are based on past political history, offer incomplete and often conflicting guidelines as to future electoral behavior. We conclude that the complexity and dramatically changing demographic and social environment of California preclude the use of simple formulae."^{iv}

It is undisputable, therefore, that the Masters did not attempt to draw "competitive" districts. But the focus of this Rose Institute Case Study is to determine whether competitive districts resulted from the Master's work, regardless of whether it was a specified goal.

Competitive Analysis

The Masters' report details the many factors that they believe would have to be considered if they were to attempt a competitive analysis of their proposed plans:

"[A]n analysis of "political fairness" in California in the 1990's will include recognition of the duplication and "deadwood" in the registration rolls; the change in the composition of two-party registration (i.e., the relative decline in the share of registered Democrats) and the resulting change in the nature of the vote-registration ratio(67); the increase in third-party and decline-to-state registrants, now well over 10 percent of the total; the critical decline in voter participation; the vastly different vote-registration ratios of incumbents compared with contestants in open

districts; the impact of candidate personality, policy issues, and campaign finance; the potential political mobilization of millions of unregistered citizens and the prospect of citizenship for large numbers of permanent resident aliens; and, last but not least, term limits."^v

Undeniably, a challenging proposition, but thankfully for our purposes, that describes the requirements of predicting future competition, while we only want to evaluate the presence or lack of presence of competition in past elections. Our purpose can be achieved using only past election results.

We acknowledge that a number of the factors mentioned by the Masters, and other factors raised in the academic literature on this topic, are not directly reflected in the election results. For example, a potentially competitive district where one party fails to recruit a viable candidate would appear uncompetitive in its election results for that year. By looking at election results over the life of the district – a ten-year span inclusive of elections in 1992, 2000, and every even-numbered year in between – and by limiting our analysis to whether a seat changed hands, virtually all of these factors are accommodated to a degree sufficient for our case study (with the exception of Congressional District 38, which will be addressed later in this report).

Competitive Definition

For the purposes of this case study, we define a competitive district as one that changed hands without changing lines: in one or more elections the Republican candidate won, and, in the same district, in another election or elections the Democratic candidate won. At a basic level, this is the goal of the "competitiveness" advocates: a district that changes representation as the voting preferences of the district's voters change. Our approach to defining competitiveness is a utilitarian one. Clearly many experts can make

numerous arguments for and against our measure, and it lacks the statistical rigor of some methods described in the literature of the field. It is, however, an easily understood and easily reviewed measure, which can be quickly applied to California in the 1990s or any other past redistricting effort.

We should be clear that this measure has no predictive usage: it is only a review of past districts, not a tool for predicting whether a newly-drawn plan will or will not prove competitive in elections in future years.

Congressional District 38 reveals the limitations of our approach. In CD 38, Republican Stephen Horn was elected by a relatively narrow margin in 1992. He continued to win narrowly in every election from 1992 through 2000, and his district was undeniably "competitive."^{vi} Yet it never changed party control and, as a result, does not appear in our list of districts that changed hands, or that we term "competitive." Yet despite its lack of perfection, our approach is easy to use, check and understand. A final note regarding the data: State Senate Districts 9 and 39 changed from Independent incumbents to Democratic control in 1998 and 1996. But our primary interest is finding competition between the two major parties, so we do not include these two districts in our counts of competitive districts.

Competitive Findings

Our case study of California in the 1990s finds a remarkable number of competitive districts: ten Congressional Districts, six State Senate Districts, and fourteen Assembly Districts changed party control over the course of the decade. In fact, four Congressional, two State Senate, and seven Assembly Districts changed control twice in the five elections reviewed. In each election year, a minimum of two Assembly Districts,

one State Senate District, and three Congressional Districts changed hands. Even the traditional incumbency advantages were insufficient to guarantee re-election: nine Congressional incumbents, three State Senators, and eight Assembly members lost bids for re-election. In Congressional District 49, both incumbent Democrat Lynn Schenk (in 1994) and incumbent Republican Brian Bilbray (2000) were defeated. And all this competition occurred without the use of a competitiveness criterion.

The competitive nature of the Masters' districts stands in stark contrast to our current highly gerrymandered district lines: in 2004 not one Assembly, State Senate or Congressional district changed party control. As noted earlier, factors including candidate recruitment can have more impact on a single-year analysis than on a decade-long review, but the total absence of any control changes is a revealing indicator of the incumbent protection gerrymander at work. From a minimum of seven districts in 2000 to a maximum of fourteen districts changing hands in 1994, the 1990s redistricting plan created a political arena in California where representation shifted to reflect shifts in the views of the electorate. In 2004 with zero districts changing hands, the incumbent desire for self-preservation is demonstrably at work. A change in district control is likely to occur only as a result of some scandal, not because of shifts in voter allegiance. Even in those open-seat districts where incumbents left office in 2004, their party's designated successors had little trouble maintaining district control in the 2004 general election.

Conclusions

Even without an active effort to increase or maximize competitiveness, the community of interest approach of the Special Masters resulted in relatively competitive plans for California's Assembly, State Senate, and Congressional Districts.

One might dispute our findings with claims that Congressional District 38, and perhaps other districts, should be added to our list of competitive 1990s districts. But that would only strengthen our findings.

This case study does not address the question of whether the addition of a requirement to increase or maximize competitiveness would further increase the competitive nature of a redistricting plan. It is reasonable to assume that this would be true. But our findings do support the claim that such a redistricting criterion need not supersede more traditional criteria (such as communities of interest, city and county integrity, compactness, and the Federal Voting Rights Act). In fact, those criteria, at least based on their application in California, when honestly applied by relatively non-partisan people such as the retired judges who served as California's Special Masters, result in considerable competitiveness. Based on these findings, our suggestion would be that any competitiveness requirement be made the final adjustment in districting, and play a secondary role to protection of communities, compactness, and the Voting Rights Act.

End Notes

ⁱ The Special Masters were Retired Justice George A. Brown, Presiding Master of the panel; Retired Judge Rafael H. Galceran; and Retired Judge Thomas Kongsgaard.

ⁱⁱ 10 Cal.3d 396, 402, 410-414, also referred to as *Reinecke IV*.

ⁱⁱⁱ For additional detail on the criteria, see the "REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SPECIAL MASTERS ON REAPPORTIONMENT," available at <http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/reapp/reapp90-report/>

^{iv} "Report and Recommendations", Ch. 6

^v "Report and Recommendations", Ch. 6

^{vi} In 1992, Horn won by 9,238 votes, or six percent. In 2000, he was re-elected for his final term by 1,768 votes, or one percent.

1990s Congressional Districts
Party Control by Year

CD	92	94	inc. ran	inc. win	96	inc. ran	inc. win	98	inc. ran	inc. win	00	inc. ran	inc. win	Changed	Freq.	Incumbent
CD 01	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	YES	twice	Hamburg / Riggs / Thompson
CD 02	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 03	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	YES	once	Fazio / Ose
CD 04	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 05	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 06	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 07	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 08	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 09	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y			
CD 10	R	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	YES	once	Baker / Tauscher
CD 11	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 12	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 13	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 14	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 15	D	D	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	YES	twice	Mineta/ Campbell/ Honda
CD 16	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 17	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 18	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 19	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	YES	once	Lehman / Radanovich
CD 20	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 21	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 22	R	R	N	N	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	YES	once	Huffington - Seastrand / Capps - Capps
CD 23	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 24	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 25	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 26	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 27	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	YES	once	Rogan / Schiff
CD 28	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 29	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 30	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 31	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N			
CD 32	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 33	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 34	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y			

1990s Congressional Districts
Party Control by Year

CD	92	94	inc. ran	inc. win	96	inc. ran	inc. win	98	inc. ran	inc. win	00	inc. ran	inc. win	Changed	Freq.	Incumbent
CD 35	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 36	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	R	N	N	D	Y	N	YES	twice	Harman / Kuykendall / Harman
CD 37	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 38	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 39	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 40	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 41	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y			
CD 42	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N			
CD 43	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 44	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 45	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 46	R	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	YES	once	Dornan / Sanchez
CD 47	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 48	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N			
CD 49	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	YES	twice	Schenk / Billbray / Davis
CD 50	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y			
CD 51	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
CD 52	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y			
Number of Reps	22	25			23			24			20			6	once	
Number of Dems	30	27			29			28			32			4	twice	
Changed Control		3			4			3			4			10	Seats Changed Party Control	
Inc. Running		48			49			46			48					
Inc. Reelected		45			46			46			45					
Inc. Lost		3			3			0			3					
Note: Campbell (R-CD15) took office midway through the cycle																

1990s State Senate Districts
Control by Year

SD	92	94	inc. ran	inc. win	96	inc. ran	inc. win	98	inc. ran	inc. win	00	inc. ran	inc. win	Changed	
SD 01	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 02	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 03	D	D			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 04	D	R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y	R				
SD 05	D	D			D	Y	Y	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 06	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 07	D	D			R	N	N	R			D	N	N	twice	Boatwright/ Rainey/ Torlakson
SD 08	I	I	Y	Y	I			D	N	N	D			once *	Kopp/ Speier
SD 09	D	D			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 10	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 11	R	R			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	once	Morgan/ Sher
SD 12	D	R	Y	N	R			R	Y	Y	R				McCorquodale - Monteith
SD 13	D	D			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 14	R	R	Y	Y	R			R	N	N	R				
SD 15	D	D			R	N	N	R			R	N	N	once	Mello/ McPherson
SD 16	R	D	Y	N	D			D	Y	Y	D				
SD 17	R	R			R	N	N	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 18	D	D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	D				
SD 19	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 20	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 21	R	R			D	N	N	D			D	N	N	once	Russell/ Schiff - Scott
SD 22	D	D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	D				
SD 23	D	D			D	Y	Y	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 24	D	D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	D				
SD 25	D	D			D	Y	Y	D			D	Y	Y		
SD 26	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 27	R	R			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	once	Beverly/ Karnette
SD 28	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 29	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 30	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 31	R	R			R	N	N	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 32	R	D	Y	Y	D			D	N	N	D				
SD 33	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 34	D	R	Y	Y	R			D	Y	N	D			twice	Dunn/ Hurt/ Dunn
SD 35	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 36	D	R	N	N	R			R	Y	Y	R				
SD 37	R	R			R	Y	Y	R			R	Y	Y		
SD 38	R	R	Y	Y	R			R	N	N	R				
SD 39	I	I			D	N	N	D			D	Y	Y	once *	Killea/ Alpert
SD 40	D	D	Y	Y	D			D	Y	Y	D				
<i>Note: Data for all Senate seats not up for election in 92 are based off 90 data</i>															
Number of Reps	15	17			16			15			14				
Number of Dems	23	21			23			25			26			4	once
Number of Indep.	2	2			1			0			0			2	twice
Change Maj. Party		1			5			1			1			6 *	Changed Major Party Control
Inc.s Running		16			9			9			17			<i>Two additional seats changed from I to D</i>	
Inc.s Reelected		14			9			8			17				
Inc. Lost		2			0			1			0				

1990s Assembly Districts
Party Control by Year

AD	92	94	inc. ran	inc. win	96	inc. ran	inc. win	98	inc. ran	inc. win	00	inc. ran	inc. win	Changed	
AD 01	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 02	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 03	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 04	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 05	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 06	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 07	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 08	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 09	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 10	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 11	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 12	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 13	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 14	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 15	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 16	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 17	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 18	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 19	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 20	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 21	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 22	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 23	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 24	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	once	Cunneen / Cohn
AD 25	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	once	Snyder / House
AD 26	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 27	D	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	twice	Farr / MacPherson / Keeley
AD 28	D	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	twice	Areias / Frusetta / Salinas
AD 29	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 30	D	R	N	N	R	N	N	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	twice	Costa / Setench / Prenter
AD 31	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 32	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 33	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 34	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 35	D	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	twice	O'Connell / Firestone / Jackson
AD 36	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 37	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 38	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 39	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 40	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 41	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 42	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 43	R	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	once	Rogan / Wildman
AD 44	R	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	once	Hoge / Scott
AD 45	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 46	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 47	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 48	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 49	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 50	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 51	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 52	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		

1990s Assembly Districts
Party Control by Year

AD	92	94	inc. ran	inc. win	96	inc. ran	inc. win	98	inc. ran	inc. win	00	inc. ran	inc. win	Changed	
AD 53	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 54	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	twice	Karnette / Kuykendall / Lowenthal
AD 55	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 56	D	R	Y	N	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	twice	Epple / Hawkins / Havice
AD 57	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 58	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 59	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 60	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 61	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	N	N	once	Aguiar / Soto
AD 62	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y		
AD 63	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 64	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 65	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 66	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 67	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 68	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 69	D	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	D	Y	N	D	Y	Y	twice	Umberg / Morrissey / Correa
AD 70	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 71	R	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y		
AD 72	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 73	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 74	R	R	N	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N		
AD 75	R	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	R	Y	Y		
AD 76	D	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 77	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	once	Connolly / Baldwin
AD 78	D	D	Y	Y	D	N	N	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y		
AD 79	D	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	Y	Y	D	N	N		
AD 80	D	R	Y	N	R	Y	Y	R	Y	Y	R	N	N	once	Bornstein / Battin
Number of Reps	31	41			37			32			30			7	once
Number of Dems	49	39			43			48			50			7	twice
Changed Control		10			4			5			2			14	Seats that Changed Party Control
Inc.s Running		57			48			56			48				
Inc.s Reelected		52			47			54			48				
Inc. Lost		5			1			2			0				